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| Hot pursuit | | Need to check infiltration | |
by Gen Ashok K. Mehta
Has hot pursuit become hot air? Gen Pervez Musharraf’s latest warning to India against hot pursuit is that it will be “paid back in the same coin”. The Pakistan Foreign Office spokesperson even said: “This could trigger a nuclear war”.
Bluff? Brinkmanship ? Or a serious threat ? Like the attack on Parliament, the Mumbai blasts have revived the challenge of infiltration and cross-border terrorism(CBT) not just from Pakistan but also Bangladesh and Nepal.
For long now, Nepal has been a conduit for infiltration into J&K and the rest of India. The mix of terrorism, insurgency and low intensity conflict sponsored by the ISI is designed to pressurise India into making concessions on J&K.
Pakistan’s proxy war has a long history and began in 1947 with the infiltration of tribesmen into J&K. Despite the India-Pakistan peace process, there is no let-up in the proxy war and violence.
Operation Parakram (2002) highlighted India’s response-dilemma, making it accept the ground reality: discretion is the better part of valour as Jaswant Singh’s latest book, “A Call to Honour,” has revealed. The security forces in J&K have contained the menace through a sound politico-militarycounter-terrorism strategy.
The current attrition ratio of the Army is an unprecedented 1:11, that is for every soldier killed terrorists lose 11 of their own. That’s a big price. While the terrorists are unable to hurt the security forces, they are instead hurting the ordinary people of the state. They have, therefore, been seeking targets outside J&K also,crossing the red line into other parts of India. The ISI is playing the great game of destabilising India. But by using local terrorist nodules,no tell-tale signs are left for the jigsaw.
Pakistan restarted its proxy war in 1988 and till last year, 42,000 persons were killed, nearly 86 per cent Kashmiri Muslims. The period 1992-95 saw the highest levels of infiltration, violence and fatalities averaging annually more than 3000 attacks against security forces and others.
Thereafter, there was a perceptible decline in violence till Kargil was sprung. Violence perked up again. A marked downslide in infiltration and CBT began following Operation Parakram in the wake of the attack on Parliament. For example, against 3,200 terrorist-initiated incidents in1994, the figures for the last three years are: 499,348 and 333 in 2006 so far.
Infiltration has been brought down progressively from 2,417 in 2001 to 597 terrorists who got into J&K last year. Infiltration is maximum during summer when snow over passes north of Pir Panjal melts. Other reasons like Doda by-elections, the Srinagar round table, and India-Pakistan dialogue have to be factored.
Between May and June 2005, in 20 infiltration attempts 58 terrorists were killed compared to 15 attempts for the same period this year when 46 terrorists were killed.Till 5 July, 191 terrorists had sneaked in.
In encounters and operations on an average 920 terrorists were killed, each in 2004 and 2005. Further, substantial recoveries — 550 weapons, 2.5lakh round of ammunition and 5 tonnes of explosives — were made in the last 18 months.
The number of terrorists who surrendered in 2005 was 80 and already this year, it has crossed the 100 mark. This year, the Army had enhanced its kill ratio from 1:8 to 1:11. The Pakistan Army waging LIC on its Western borders has a1:1.85 attrition rate.
At any one time, the terrorist population in J&K is believed to be between 1,600 and 1,800 but never below1,500. Of these 55 per cent are foreigners and the rest from J&K. Despite the commitment made by President Musharraf on January 6 2004, and twice at the height of Operation Parakram, that Pakistan would not allow the use of territory under its control, infiltration and CBT have been business as usual.
The normal 400 electronic messages are exchanged daily between CBT control stations in Pakistan, PoK and J&K. As many as 59 camps are functional across the LoC with at least 2,000 (some say 5000) trained infiltrators, ready as replenishment.
Unable to hurt the Army, terrorists are increasingly targeting civilians, and the paramilitary forces. The hand grenade has become the favourite weapon. Fifty per cent of the 130 grenade attacks till mid-July had been in the Srinagar valley.
Terrorists have outsourced lobbing of grenades to children and civilians for Rs 50 a throw. Tourists and civilians have been made special targets. Last month, nine innocent Nepali labourers were executed. Terrorist atrocities on civilians have elicited no public outrage. In June, at Gul Gulabgarh village, terrorists chopped off the noses and ears of an entire family.
As in early 1990s, terrorists have begun to orchestrate civilian mob protests against security forces. Fidayeen attacks and use of explosive-laden vehicles are also tapering because the security forces have taken deterrent action.
Between 1999 and 2005, 67 cases of Fidayeen attacks were recorded in which 131 terrorists were killed for 237 security forces and 131 civilian fatalities which is an impressive 1:2 in favour of the Fidayeen. Ninety per cent of these attacks were launched by Lashkar-e-Toiba. Interestingly, there has not been a single incident of suicide bombing.
Despite the fencing, sensor technology, three-tier deployment, 900 terrorists killed annually and huge recoveries of weapons and explosives, the ISI has succeeded in maintaining its desired pool of 1,500 terrorists in J&K. This is the number it feels adequate to keep its freedom fight in J&K alive and kicking.
India’s armed might has not been able to degrade Pakistan’s capacity for proxy war. No matter how effective the counter-terrorism strategy and operational tactics, till the source and infrastructure of terrorism in Pakistan and conduits in Bangladesh and Nepal are neutralised, infiltration and violence will continue till the cows come home.
The decision by the ISI to reach out to disaffected Muslims in India was made after the demolition of Babri Masjid. A sleeper cell network was formed. At the same time, Nepal and Bangladesh were also placed on the terrorist grid. An elaborate ISI establishment mushroomed in Nepal, centred in the Kathmandu Embassy.
Several Islamic NGOs and charitable institutions with funds from Saudi Arabia grew up. In 1994 the Nepal Police, at the instigation of RAW, busted an ISI cell operating from Hotel Karnali in Kathmandu under codename Operation Tufail. The hijacking of IC814 to Kandahar has made the ISI in Nepal legendary. With a new Nepal in the offing, Indian diplomacy should be able to cut the ISI to size. That will leave Bangladesh with 20 million of its people already in India. Delhi can lose no more time to act against the cult of deniability perfected by Dhaka. Like their comrades in crime in Pakistan, Bangladeshis are asking for proof and evidence.
Returning to hot pursuit, in the mid 1990s, there was a chance to strike at the root of CBT across the LoC but political will was missing. After the attack on Parliament by LeT and Jaish-e-Mohammad, India’s coercive diplomacy and Operation Parakram could not end jehadi terrorism which Pakistan has turned into an instrument of its foreign policy, Pakistan’s nuclear equaliser has negated the military option.
It is, therefore, futile crowing over hot pursuit and destroying terrorist infrastructure which is mobile. Soon after 9/11, Pervez Musharraf while asking India to “lay off” said that India should not think it is the US and Pakistan, the Taliban. Even so there are ways and means of raising the cost for Pakistan while reminding it to keep its side of the bargain for India to negotiate on Kashmir seriously and keep the peace process alive. But before anything else, we have to set our own house in order.
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