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| Pak 'Kashmir line' isn't encouraging | | MEN & MATTERS | | B L KAK
Amid Islamabad's noises in support of 'strength and stability' of Kashmiri people, a highly important signal has come in about the shape of events to come in Jammu and Kashmir. The signal is not encouraging at all, considering Islamabad's unconcealed strategy to prevent New Delhi from selling its 'Kashmir line'. Islamabad seems keen on making Kashmir Valley's majority community accept Pakistan's 'Kashmir line', which is totally different from New Delhi's 'Kashmir line'. The latter is now an open secret in the form of Jammu and Kashmir strategy. Clearly, the Manmohan Singh Government's new buzzword for the troubled State is development with peace. Equally important is the Centre's willingness to talk to any separatist group willing to shun violence.
On the other hand, Islamabad's 'Kashmir line' is, apparently, designed to maintain Pakistan's upper hand while negotiating a 'peaceful' settlement of the Kashmir issue or sorting out differences and hammering out required mechanism in respect of the future status of the State of Jammu and Kashmir and of Kashmiri people in particular. If Pakistan's influence or interference in Kashmir appears to be a force to reckon with, India cannot be expected to take steps backward.
That India has, and will have, a decisive role to play in Jammu and Kashmir has become clearer than before, withe Prime Minister, Manmohan Singh, making clear New Delhi's legitmate plans and perceptions vis-a-vis Kashmir. At a time when the Musharraf musings have suggested divisioning of Jammu and Kashmir on communal lines, Manmohan Singh rightly intervened and made public New Delhi's standpoint against redrawing of boundaries.
Pro-Pakistan patriots in Kashmir in general and Islamabad in particular need not be displeased or dissatisfied with Manmohan Singh's oppositon to re-drawing of boundaries as it is in line with the stand taken by the international community during and after the 1999 Kargil conflict. International community's message was loud and clear: Pakistan should respect the sanctity of the Line of Control (LoC). Again, the international community, the USA in particular, will be, like New Delhi, comfortable with the softening of the LoC. On the other hand, Islamabad's offical stand is not for accepting the LoC as a solution to the 57-year-old dispute betwen the two countries. Islamabad has also opposed the idea of greater autonomy as a solution to the Kashmir crisis. Perhaps, Pakistan, in the name of the wishes and expectations of Kashmiri people, wants India to accept what is acceptable to Islamabad.
This kind of atitude will not pay. Pakistan will have to understand what is acceptable and what is not acceptable to New Delhi. Perhaps, Islamabad wants the average Kashmir Muslim to get influenced by religious considerations, even as a large section of the local population in the Valley loyal to the mainstream politcal party, National Conference, has already been found in support of 'greater autonomy' formual for the region. If dispasionate expderts were asked to give opinion on the two proposals--one floated by Gen. Musharraf and the other from J&K National Conference--they would, without any reservation, call for re-examination of the autonomy formula of Farooq Abdullah before incorporating it in India's agenda for dialogue process with Pakistan.
Their opponents in Pakistan and elsewhere in the world continue to be engaged in a tough battle against their growth and consolidation. But the two most dreaded organizations--Al Qaeda and Taliban--continue to be a force to reckon with. A series of events in Pakistani territory close to the Afghan border in recent days have confirmed, if any confirmation was needed, that Al Qaeda and Taliban are locked in a symbolic relationship.
Hence,Pakistan President Gen. Pervez Musharraf’s claims that the rise of Taliban-like extremism – and not Al Qaeda - is cause for concern in Waziristan is unrealistic. Even as Pakistani officialdom makes a clear distinction between the Taliban and Al Qaeda, experts insit that the two organizations are locked in a symbolic relationship in which a crackdown on the former automatically galvanises the latter
A top military source has been quoted as telling the British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC): “We told the Taliban that they have a future as a political entity indigenous to the area, whereas Al Qaeda doesn’t". Experts say this perception allowed a large number of Afghan Taliban and their fellow Al Qaeda fighters to enter Waziristan during the US bombing of the Tora Bora mountain ranges in December 2001. Pakistan said at the time that it had sealed the border to prevent militants hiding in Tora Bora from crossing over into Waziristan.
But locals in Pakistan tell a completely different story. “Hundreds of Taliban and foreign militants were seen lining up at public baths in Wana and Miranshah in those days,” Zubair Mehsud, a law professor at Peshawar University, has been quoted as saying. “They would be covered in dirt, some would be injured, others near starvation. They would clean themselves up, arrange for local protection and disappear into the rural areas,” said Mehsud. Wana residents say these refugee militants included Afghan Taliban, Central Asians and Arabs.
According to BBC, trafficking in foreign militants was a relatively controlled affair before the September 2001 attacks, “closely monitored and often orchestrated by the Pakistan Army”. “But the sudden influx after the Tora Bora bombing led to a kind of a free-for-all,” a Wana tribal leader has b een quoted by a section of Pakistani media early this week. Swathes of unemployed locals, many of whom had never had connections with the militant networks in Afghanistan, suddenly discovered the lucrative business of harbouring foreign militants.
Grocery stores in towns such as Wana and Miranshah were suddenly overflowing with canned foodstuffs such as tuna fish and mushrooms. Military officials do not deny these events -- only interpret them differently. It is impossible to completely seal off Pakistan’s border with Afghanistan along the Waziristan region, according to Pak officials. So when the bombing of Tora Bora drove the militants into Waziristan, a large number of local smugglers and criminals seized it as an opportunity for making money by providing them with shelter and provisions.
A 20 kilogram sack of sugar worth 10 dollars was sold to the Arabs for as much as 100 dollars in those days. This was very different from the "culture of hospitality" seen during the anti-Soviet war, when militants were housed as honoured guests by the proud tribesmen. BBC has let it be known that the new situation presents Pakistan with two policy options: it could declare an indiscriminate war on all foreign militants and their local protectors or it could try to isolate the locals from the foreigners. The government chose the latter. There are many in Pakistan’s security apparatus who expect that one day, when the Americans are gone, the Taliban will regain power in Afghanistan. Therefore, they argue, it is essential to have good relations with the Taliban in order for Pakistan’s western borders to be secure. |
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