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| Victory elusive in modern war and politics | | |
by Andrew J. Bacevich
IN the wake of the war in southern Lebanon, claims of victory are legion. Hardly had the shooting stopped than Sheik Hassan Nasrallah was asserting that Hezbollah had triumphed. Others see Syria or Iran or even Shiite Islam as the big winner. Meanwhile, Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert, seconded by President Bush, doggedly insists that Israel came out on top.
What are we to make of these competing claims? What is victory anyway? Ardently pursued, victory in the modern era has been remarkably elusive. Genuine victory implies something more than military success; it must have a political dimension. Even then, results often prove other than expected. Understanding why requires that we appreciate the intimate relationship between war and politics.
“Victory” that defeats the enemy but leaves intact the issues giving rise to war in the first place is likely to prove hollow. The ensuing “peace” is false; after a brief interval, hostilities are likely to resume. World War I offers a classic illustration.
The 1945 Allied victory finally solved the German problem. But the military victory in 1945 – as clear-cut as any in history – emphatically did not produce peace. Instead, it created the conditions for a new conflict, the Cold War, which began almost immediately. Ambiguous shooting wars in places such as Korea, Vietnam and Afghanistan ensued, as did a succession of conflicts in the Middle East.
In 1967, conflict between Israel and its Arab neighbors yielded what appeared to be a decidedly unambiguous outcome. But what did this exemplary battlefield success produce? Apart from preserving the Jewish state from destruction — a considerable achievement — the fruits of victory over Egypt, Jordan and Syria in the Six-Day War proved disappointing.
A more dangerous conflict with Egypt ensued just six years later. More tragically, victory-induced dreams of a Greater Israel served only to enlarge and aggravate Israel’s Palestinian problem. Out of the ugly, debilitating conflict that ensued came Hamas and Hezbollah.
Since 1967, Israel has won a thousand little fights, but victory that actually settles something remains a chimera. The truth is that absent an Israeli willingness to engage in total war, as the Allies did against the Axis, the Palestinians will never submit — and even then the Arabs would be unlikely to make peace.
When the Cold War finally ended in 1989, many in the West proclaimed it the greatest victory since 1945. But it was a paradoxical victory: We did not defeat the enemy militarily, and yet the political issues underlying the Cold War had quietly vanished.
The Persian Gulf War produced a seemingly stupendous military victory for the U.S.-led coalition. Saddam survived, so the underlying political problem remained. The United States invaded Iraq in March 2003 intent on correcting the “mistake” of 1991 by getting rid of Saddam. This time we had finished the job. Yet to our dismay, once again a military victory produced not peace but something akin to chaos.
Frustrated American hawks and some anxious Israelis now want to up the ante. Believing that big victories require big wars, some advocate attacking Iran. But even if a war against Iran was winnable militarily — a large assumption indeed — would victory solve our political problems? History says don’t count on it.
Bacevich is professor of history and international relations at Boston University
By arrangement with LA Times-Washington Post
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