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| No end to terrorism | | Pak army and nationalism are to blame | | by Anita Inder Singh
AT first it may seem surprising that extremists inspired by Pakistan had a hand in the London bombings of 7/7 last year and the recent attempts to blow up aeroplanes leaving British airports for the United States. For Pakistan has since long been a Western ally. In the 1950s Pakistan started receiving military aid from the US; it became a member of SEATO and the British-sponsored CENTO. And during the Cold War it was regarded by the West as an anti-communist ally, which, unlike nonaligned India, refrained from being a nuisance by not lecturing the West about the international insecurity fostered by military alliances. Pakistan has also been the third largest recipient of American military largesse, after Israel and Egypt.
However, almost five years after the US and Pakistan joined forces in hunting down Al-Qaeda and Taliban militants in north-western Pakistan, extremist violence sponsored by Pakistan has increased in Afghanistan, suggesting that NATO forces there may have embarked on an steep climb. American and UN officials — and General Musharraf himself — have said that extremists have crossed over from Pakistan into Afghanistan.
The 9/11 Commission Report on terrorism highlighted Pakistan’s prominent role in promoting terrorism. Since 2001 Pakistan’s alliance with the US has not induced Islamabad to renounce extremism as an instrument of state policy, either in Afghanistan or in the Indian part of Kashmir.
Why does Pakistan train extremists? The explanation may lie in two main factors — Pakistan’s definition as an Islamic nation-state, and the political illegitimacy of its military rulers who have dominated its politics for much of its history.
Pakistan was carved out of British India in August 1947 as a nation-state in the literal sense of an alignment of the religious nation and territory, as a Muslim homeland in South Asia. Since then weak civilian politicians, like illegitimate military rulers, have played the religious card to mobilise political support. Even elected rulers have had to display credentials as “true” Muslims; indeed the Taliban, created by the late General Zia-ul-Haq, was sustained by the Government of Pakistan’s best-known politician, Ms Benazir Bhutto. The idea that the religious nation is — or should be — a monolithic whole creates a problem by preventing or restricting the intellectual and political choice innate in democracy. And, lacking legitimacy, Pakistan’s military rulers have forged an alliance with religious extremists to shore up their political and moral standing.
This alliance has had domestic and international fallout. Pakistan inherited, and continued with, an authoritarian tradition from the British. Pakistan’s weak politicians were unable to heal sectarian and regional divisions, which made it difficult for them to frame a constitution for a democratic Pakistan. In fact, Ayub Khan’s coup took place only two years after the promulgation of Pakistan’s first constitution in 1956. Since Pakistan’s birth no elected government has ever completed its term in office; and since 1958, all have held office at the pleasure of the army.
The military appeared as the only power capable of patching up the country’s divisions and introducing better governance, but the reality was more complex. The military acquired control over domestic and foreign policy, the budget, and powers of patronage in both state and private sectors.
Pakistan’s creation was rooted in opposition to India, which has been branded as a permanent enemy. Pakistan’s determination to get Kashmir separated from India meant that, on an average, 6 per cent of Pakistan’s GDP has been spent on defence. This, combined with the military’s wish to acquire legitimacy, has motivated it to foster extremist groups. To embarrass India, Pakistan backed insurgencies in Punjab and Jammu and Kashmir, and the image of India as the eternal foe led the military to conceive of extremist attacks to embarrass, weaken and, hopefully, to defeat India.
At another level, after the Soviet retreat from Afghanistan some mujahideen returned home to Pakistan and searched for new causes to wage jihad. Pakistan became a well-known base for several terrorist organisations. They included the Lashkar-e-Toiba, and the Jaish-e-Muhammad (which at one time was patronised by General Musharraf, before it turned against him after 2001). These organisations were described by the UN as “belonging to or associated with” the Taliban and Al-Qaeda.
One domestic aspect of the alliance between the military and clergy is the promotion of militant Islam in madarsas. At least 10 to 15 per cent of the madarsas, often funded by Saudi Arabia, promoted militant forms of Islam. In June 2004 General Musharraf himself admitted that many madarsas were involved in militancy and extremism.
Not surprisingly there is considerable anti-American sentiment in Pakistan. Two-thirds of Pakistanis favour the fusion of religion and politics. About 45 per cent of them have confidence in Osama bin Laden’s ability “to do the right thing” in international affairs, and half of them think that the US is bent upon world domination. Meanwhile, having spent years persuading many Pakistanis of the righteousness of jihad against Pakistan’s enemies, Pakistan’s rulers cannot suddenly tell them that it is unnecessary to fight it, especially with much of Kashmir still in Indian hands and Western troops in Afghanistan and Iraq.
In the meantime, General Musharraf’s inability to practice inclusive politics, and the absence of political forces opposed to Islamic militancy have emboldened and empowered Pakistan’s jihadis. General Musharraf has professed the politics of moderation but there are few signs that this is the norm in Pakistani politics. Perhaps this is because even the “moderation” — whatever that means — is constricted by the ideology of the religious nation-state and the need to appear to be putting it into practice.
Is General Musharraf committed to rooting out terrorism in Pakistan? Since he himself has been the target of militant attacks it is reasonable to assume that he is. On the other, hand, he seems unable or unwilling to eliminate Taliban supporters from the army and intelligence services, whose role in politics has become institutionalised. So, he is prone to justifying militant activities in India’s Jammu and Kashmir as those of “indigenous insurgents” rather than terrorists. Once again, he is bound by the religious definition of the Pakistani state.
Religion, anti-Indian, anti-Israel and anti-Western sentiments are integral components of Pakistani nationalism. And fragmented political parties have enhanced General Musharraf’s appeal. Democracy is probably not in great demand in Pakistan, or the extent of that demand is unknown. The General recognises the extremist threat but cannot bring himself to dispense with militants in politics. So, it is unlikely that Pakistan will stop exporting terrorism. The best defence for liberal, culturally diverse societies is to strengthen the channels and institutions for dialogue, mediation and reconciliation, even as they try to fight terrorism militarily.
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