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| Bush-Musharraf ‘deal’ | | India needs a Look West policy | |
by G. Parthasarathy
AS President Bush approaches the middle of his second and final term in office, the “neoconservatives”, who dominated his defence and foreign policy establishment and advocated the use of overwhelming military power, particularly in the “Greater Middle East”, are in disarray. The limitations of American military power have been exposed in North-East Asia by North Korea, which has manufactured nuclear weapons, disregarding American pressures. But it is in Iraq that the limitations of American military power have been fully exposed. The Americans have found that it is relatively easy to conquer Iraq, but virtually impossible to contain a full blown insurgency in which over 2000 Americans have been killed.
The invasion has not only destabilised Iraq, but also, according to a Pentagon report, resulted in “conditions that lead to a civil war in Iraq”. Moves to introduce parliamentary democracy have led to a situation that could result in the partition of Iraq on sectarian Shia-Sunni and ethnic Arab-Kurd lines. Despite bringing in 7000 additional troops recently, the Americans are finding that in the last two months there have been 3400 casualties in Baghdad alone, with 90 per cent of these casualties being caused by executions carried out by Shia and Sunni death squads.
With the Americans stretched and stuck in a quagmire in Iraq, Iran knows that the US is in no position to resort to military force either to end Iranian military assistance to the Hezbollah, or to deal with Iranian defiance of demands made by the UN Security Council that it should suspend its nuclear enrichment programme by August 31. While the US would like to move quickly towards imposing sanctions on Teheran, neither Russia nor China is going to be rushed into agreeing to sanctions.
Russian Defence Minister Sergei Ivanov has announced that Russia would not be ready to back US and UK proposals for imposing sanctions against Iran, as the issue was not so “urgent” to consider sanctions, at this stage. China has voiced similar views.
EU Foreign Ministers meeting in Finland on September 1 asked for further discussions with Iran, rather than sanctions. Significantly, UN-Secretary General Kofi Annan joined the anti-sanctions chorus stating: “I do not believe that sanctions are the solution to everything. There are times when a little patience is more effective”. It does, therefore, appear that any negotiated settlement with Iran would involve prolonged negotiations and some accommodation of Iran’s assertion about its “right” to enrich uranium. Any resolution of the Iran nuclear issue could involve limitations on the level of enrichment to ensure that the enriched uranium is used for power reactors and not for nuclear weapons.
American realisation of the limitations of military power is also evident in Afghanistan. The Americans know that the Taliban leadership is comfortably lodged in Quetta in Balochistan with the support of General Musharraf and the ISI. They also know that with a ceasefire and peace process underway between the Musharraf dispensation and the pro-Taliban tribal leadership in the tribal areas of the North-West Frontier Province (NWFP), the Taliban and their Al-Qaeda, Chechen and Uzbek allies will now be able to operate against NATO and Afghan government forces from bases in both Balochistan and the NWFP.
The Americans have reduced their troop levels in Afghanistan and NATO members like the UK, Germany, Netherlands and Canada have been forced to undertake larger troop deployments there. More importantly, even though American and NATO forces operating in Afghanistan and their diplomats in Kabul are furious about the sanctuary that Pakistan is providing to the Taliban, they are under strict orders not to be critical of Pakistan and to sound sweet and nice when talking about the Musharraf government.
Given these developments, there are inevitable suspicions about a “deal” between the Bush Administration, which recognises the growing war weariness in the US on the one hand, and General Musharraf, desperately seeking legitimacy, on the other. General Musharraf knows that the Americans will have to live with him as their “best option,” even if he keeps his Taliban allies ready to strike across the Durand Line at American, NATO and Afghan government forces.
What could such a “deal” involve? General Musharraf would expect continuing American support for his re-election as President in 2007 and for his domestic policies. Evidence of such US “understanding” about General Musharraf’s domestic policies was clear in the US reaction to the brutal killing of Nawab Akbar Bugti, when the State Department expressed support for a “strong and unified Pakistan”, while alluding to what it said was Bugti’s “taking up arms”. General Musharraf would obviously like to see an important role for his Taliban allies in the Kabul government with Taliban leaders like Mullah Jalaluddin Haqqani holding crucial positions on security issues, in return for his assisting President Bush to “get” Osama bin Laden.
It is now evident that President Bush is not going to be able to claim that he had successfully dealt with either “Islamic fascists” or the “Axis of Evil” comprising Libya, Iraq, Iran and North Korea before he relinquishes office. But his fellow countrymen will judge him positively if he is able to deliver the head of Osama bin Laden on a platter to them. This is not going to be possible unless he keeps his “best bet” General Musharraf in good humour. For this purpose, the Bush Administration will turn a blind eye to the strategic implications of China’s presence in the Gwadar port on the western entrances to the Persian Gulf and to China’s continuing nuclear and missile cooperation with Pakistan.
The US will also be very circumspect in dealing with Pakistani involvement in terrorism against India and elsewhere in the world. Pakistan’s military ruler will be feted in the White House and be able to tell his countrymen that he has been able to provide his armed forces with American military hardware, including 96 upgraded F-16 strike aircraft. It, however, remains to be seen how events surrounding the forthcoming presidential elections in Pakistan and an end to the saga of Osama bin Laden are sequenced and played out in the coming months.
While our “Look East” policy has brought tangible benefits to us over the past 15 years, we now need to develop a comprehensive “Look West” policy covering our relations with Pakistan, Iran, the Arab Gulf countries and Central Asia, given the directions that America’s “war on terrorism” now appears to be taking. While one cannot doubt President Bush’s commitment to give a new direction and momentum to relations with India, we also cannot ignore the implications of American policies in our western neighbourhood on our national security.
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