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| UN unlikely to oblige Kashmiri separatists | | MEN & MATTERS | |
B L KAK
Much water has flowed down the rivers in Jammu and Kashmir in recent years. Different solutions have been offered by different leaders to the Kashmir issue. And diferences persist between the moderates and hard-liners of the Kashmir Hurriyat Conference. This has not prevented a section of the Muslim separatists in Kashmir Valley from continuing the talk in support of the UN resolutions on Kashmir.
How many of them know that the United Nations (UN) is unwilling to oblige those Islamist separatists who are for implementation of UN resolutions on Jammu and Kashmir? In fact, the UN has, after 55 years, clearly indicated that it is neither anxious nor eager for invoking the 1949 resolutions on Kashmir.
Obviously, having taken due cognizance of the totally changed circumstances in Jammu and Kashmir after the resolutions on the restive north Indian State were adopted, the UN secretariat has demonstrated its unwillingness to take up a cause, which has no relevance, no basis. In other words, the issue of UN resolutions on Kashmir cannot be revived without the consent of the two major contestants, India and Pakistan.
That today’s Islamabad under the rule of Gen. Parvez Musharraf does not find the UN resolutions carrying much weight and substance is borne out by the Pakistan President’s lack of interest in making an issue out of them. Changed attitude of the present ruling dispensation in Islamabad towards the UN resolutions is also attributed to Washington’s indifferent attitude towards the supporters of the world body’s resolutions on Kashmir.
Important for Gen. Musharraf is continuance of US support to Pakistan. Thus, those in Kashmir, particularly the hard-line secessionist leader, Sayed Ali Shah Geelani, and his bandwagon, who insist on the implementation of the UN resolutions, are quite unlikely to woo Gen. Musharraf on this issue. Secondly, in view of New Delhi’s vehement opposition to the idea for implementing the UN resolutions, the task of the resolutions’ votaries in the Muslim-majority Kashmir has already become difficult.
Again, in view of India’s clear signals of its intention to stay put in Kashmir, some external forces will find it quite difficult to make Kashmir an independent territory. Not long ago, America was charged with nursing the ambition to secure a toehold in the region, and spy on Russia and China, and even India and Pakistan. But this kind of allegation is not leveled, as the sweeping geo-political changes of the past more than 15 years have effectively killed such cockamamie theories.
At the same time, it can be said without any fear of contradiction that American interest in Kashmir is not non-existent. A gradual US shift on the issue became evident in 1990s, despite the controversy that arose from the statement by former Assistant Secretary of State, Robin Raphel, that the accession of Jammu and Kashmir to India was not final. In fact, Raphel herself began saying towards the end of her term that Pakistan needed to look forward instead of looking back into history for the final resolution of the dispute.
The clear implication was that Pakistan should give up its claim to the State of J&K on the basis of history, including the UN resolutions that the UN itself is now chary of invoking. The change in Washington’s view arose from the recognition of the fundamental soundness, fairness, and longevity of the Indian nation-state, and its demonstrably secular, plural and democratic nature despite the aberrations forced by fissiparous movements.
Present US President, George W Bush’s predecessor, Bill Clinton, laid down the line that the boundaries between the two countries would not be altered by bloodshed. The self-evident success of the Indian idea of nationhood and the visibly comparable failure of the Pakistan state was instrumental in bringing this about. The shift was also accompanied by a subtle change in semantics. The Clinton administration began saying in the late 1990s that the issue should be resolved taking into account the wishes of the people of J&K, instead of earlier in-accordance-with-the-wishes formulations.
Implicit in this change was the recognition that the accordance had been subverted by sustained terror. US today appears more inclined to settle the issue on the Line of Control (LoC) as border lines, if New Delhi can deal with the secessionists.
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