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| The fudge in PM’s statement | | | - By Satish Chandra
The Prime Minister’s recent statements in Parliament on the nuclear deal have been acclaimed in many quarters as having set at rest the concerns aroused by the deal. A careful analysis of these statements, however, does not jell with these projections.
At the outset, attention may be invited to the PM’s assertion in the Lok Sabha that there is "today a willingness in the rest of the world to help India realise its inherent potential" and that India should take advantage of the opportunities afforded to it in this regard. The naiveté of such an assertion is matched only by an earlier prime ministerial statement to the effect that Siachen should be turned into a mountain of peace. The fact of the matter is that no country helps another become great. Countries become great through their own endeavours, not on the backs of others. The PM’s perception bears a Made-in-US stamp as, following Condoleezza Rice’s visit to the subcontinent during which the F-16 issue was resolved in Pakistan’s favour, the US state department in a background briefing on March 25, 2005 rather patronisingly made out that the US would "help India become a major world power in the 21st century." This was eagerly lapped up by many of our strategic pundits who did not so much as utter a word of disquiet at the resumption of F-16 sales to Pakistan!
While the PM’s justification of the nuclear deal in the Lok Sabha as an exercise in enlarging India’s "energy options" is unexceptionable, the assertion that indigenous uranium resources can only yield 10,000 MW of power for 30 years without so much as mentioning that these used in conjunction with our thorium reserves — the largest in the world — would yield over 250,000 MW of power, is clearly an instance of suppressio veri, suggestio falsi. Similarly, while highlighting the risks posed in developing hydro-power resources, the PM’s statement is totally silent on the far greater risks associated with nuclear power including those of nuclear waste disposal.
Blanket assurances in both Houses of Parliament that the independence of our foreign policy has not, and will not, be affected by the nuclear deal, are belied by our having twice voted against Iran in the IAEA and by a provision in the bill passed by the US House of Representatives to the effect that it would be the US policy to secure "India’s full and active participation" in US efforts to, if necessary, "sanction and contain Iran." The justification in the PM’s Lok Sabha statement on our vote against Iran on the grounds that it did not honour its obligations under the NPT, is untenable as Iran has not been found guilty of weaponising and is well within its rights under the NPT to engage in enrichment for peaceful purposes. In any case, it does not sit well upon us to champion an unequal treaty which we have all along reviled! Clearly, India voted against Iran under US pressure. Indeed, the overwhelming desire not to run afoul of the US is also reflected in our soft policy on Pakistan, our failure to strongly oppose the $5 billion US arms deal with Pakistan, or to raise the A.Q. Khan affair at the IAEA, our lukewarm approach to the India-Russia-China trilateral cooperation, our less than proactive approach to developments in West Asia etc. Once the deal is concluded, India’s subservience to the US will be enhanced manifold as continuance of benefits under it will be predicated on annual presidential determinations on our good behaviour. Our withdrawal from the deal would not be a practical proposition on account of our dependency on imported nuclear materials and equipment for energy security and the heavy investments already incurred on separation.
Through all the fudge in the PM’s statements in Parliament, it is evident that the separation plan was hastily evolved and that the commitment to the indigenous civil nuclear energy programme as well as the strategic deterrent is less than complete.
On the financial costs of the separation plan, the PM variously stated in the Lok Sabha that he could not "divulge" the details "at this stage," and that they were "within the realm of practical economics and political calculation." Obviously, no detailed analysis has been undertaken of the costs involved in the separation of our facilities which would, inter alia, have to extend not only to the materials and equipment, but also personnel, together with a fool-proof firewall ensuring that there is no transference of nuclear weapons relevant information from unsafeguarded to safeguarded facilities.
On the indigenous civil nuclear programme, the PM’s Lok Sabha statement, while categorical about the pursuit of research on thorium related technology, is much more circumspect about the development of fast breeders, stating that, in future, "if we produce civilian fast breeders, we will then decide whether to designate them as military or civilian." This Freudian slip gives the game away. The PM’s circumspection, on whether or not we would go ahead with fast breeders, is explained by the fact that with so much emphasis being placed on imported reactors and technology there would be few resources left for the indigenous programme.
The PM’s assertions that the integrity of our strategic programme would not be compromised carry no conviction, as the separation plan entails shutting down the Cirus Research Reactor and placing the bulk of our facilities under safeguards, thereby depriving it of the benefits of synergy, 30 per cent of our annual weapons grade plutonium production and 65 per cent of annual tritium production.
On testing, the PM’s assertion in the Lok Sabha that "India is not willing to give any commitment about the future tests" is inexplicable, since as per the July 18 statement, India, in return for full civil nuclear cooperation by the US, has already agreed to refrain from such tests. Moreover, once India becomes dependent on external fuel supplies, its testing option will effectively close because, under the proposed US legislation, the White House will be obligated to choke all fuel supplies to India, not only from the US but also from other sources.
On the Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty (FMCT), while the PM has asserted in the Rajya Sabha that India will only join a "non discriminatory, multilaterally negotiated and internationally verifiable FMCT," as per the July 18 statement, it is committed to "working with the United States" for the conclusion of the FMCT and the US has since strongly opposed the idea of international verification. It is unlikely that India will be able to withstand US pressure to change its stand on the FMCT, particularly, as one of the presidential determinations required to trigger the nuclear deal categorically demands a description of the steps taken by India to "work with the United States" for conclusion of the FMCT. This determination, incidentally, also requires a description of the steps taken by the US to encourage India "to identify and declare a date" by which it would stop production of fissile material for nuclear weapons!
The PM’s assurances that the deal will ensure full US civil nuclear cooperation, that India will not accept annual US presidential certifications about its being in compliance with its commitments, that there would be uninterrupted fuel supplies in respect of safeguarded reactors, that India would not participate in the Proliferation Security Initiative etc., are hard to accept as they run contrary to existing and evolving US legislation in the matter.
Satish Chandra has served as India’s PR to the UN in Geneva, High Commissioner to Pakistan, and Deputy National Security Adviser
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