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| How the Valley was won | | DATELINE OCT 27, 1947 | | JAGMOHAN
On October 27, 1947, a small contingent of the Indian armed forces landed at Srinagar airport and saved Kashmir for India by a whisker. On the 62nd anniversary of this historic event, it would be instructive to reflect upon the past, present and future of the Kashmir problem.
At the time of the Indian Independence Act, 1947, the political stage of Kashmir was crowded with a variety of actors. There was the National Conference, headed by Sheikh Mohammad Abdullah. It dominated the Valley but had limited influence in Jammu and Ladakh. It had developed close rapport with the leaders of the Indian National Congress, particularly Jawaharlal Nehru, but its equation with the Muslim League was marked by hostility. Mirwaiz Moulvi Yusaf Shah, who had wild and fanatical following in the downtown area of Srinagar city, was antagonistic both to the National Conference and to the Congress. Then, there was the Muslim Conference which had little following in the Valley but had acquired rapid strength amongst the Muslims of the Jammu region during the last two years on account of its ideological affinity with the Muslim League. The Maharaja was yet another force. The Dogra Rajputs of Jammu considered him their own kith and kin. The relations between him on the one hand and Sheikh Abdullah and Pandit Nehru on the other were marked by mutual distrust and dislike.
All these actors were soon to play their part in the first act of the tragic Kashmir drama. The Maharaja was indecisive. Jinnah was impatient. Pandit Nehru was caught between his idealism and stark realities. Sheikh Abdullah, with streaks of megalomania and duplicity embedded deep in the layers of his mind, was nursing secret ambitions to carve out a virtual sheikhdom for himself and his coterie.
Each one of these actors was pushed on the stage with his own illusions and believed that the drama would end the way he desired. Consequently, there was confusion and inconsistency on the stage. Several mistakes were made. And Kashmir soon found itself in the whirlpool of national and international controversy and conflict.
The first grave mistake was made when Maharaja Hari Singh flirted with the idea of independence. In June 1947, Lord Mountbatten paid a four-day visit to Kashmir. He advised the Maharaja to make up his mind. But the Maharaja dodged him.
In accordance with a sinister design to grab Jammu and Kashmir by subterfuge and armed strength, military skirmishes all along the border from Gilgit to Mirpur were manipulated to disperse the State forces. On October 22, Muslim members of the Maharaja’s forces, stationed at Poonch, treacherously mutinied in the early hours when their commander, Lt. Col. Narain Singh and his Dogra soldiers were asleep. They killed the commander and most of the Dogra soldiers, and marched to Dommel and Muzaffarabad to join the tribesmen who had launched a full scale invasion of the Valley. These tribesmen and Pakistani regulars, the "volunteers" and the "freedom fighters" were all operating under the overall command of Akbar Khan, a major-general in the Pakistani Army, who was given the code name of "General Tariq". They easily captured the border town of Darhi and Dommel and also Muzaffarabad.
In the developments from October 22 onwards, time was of prime importance. Every minute mattered. The State forces, under the command of Brig. Rajinder Singh, though hampered by large scale desertions of Muslims troops, fought to the "last man and last bullet" at Uri, delaying the advance of the main horde of raiders for two crucial days. The Uri bridge was also destroyed by the retreating forces, thereby gaining another one day.
Brig. Rajinder Singh died like a hero and made an invaluable contribution in saving the State. The Maharaja got the time to seek and obtain India’s help. V.P. Menon has compared the heroic act of Brig. Singh and his men with the historic fight put up Leonidas and his 300 gallant men who held the Persian invaders at Thermoplae.
Baramulla fell into the hands of the raiders on October 24-26. Overtaken by their wild habits, they indulged in large-scale killing, looting, burning and rape. They hardly realised that the time spent by them in committing their abominable crimes would turn out to be their punishment, as it enabled the Indian forces to land at Srinagar airport, on October 27.
Maharaja Hari Singh, in his letter of October 26, asked for accession and "attached the instrument of accession for acceptance by the Government of India". In his reply of October 27, Mountbatten accepted the accession but added: "It is my government’s wish that, as soon as law and order have been restored in Kashmir and her soil cleared of the invaders, the question of the State’s accession should be settled by a reference to the people." This addition was the second major mistake.
On October 27, a few planes of the Indian Air Force hovered over Srinagar airport carrying the first batch of Indian troops under the command of Lt. Col. Ranjit Rai. It was not certain whether the airport was safe. After landing, Lt. Col. Rai led the small contingent of the troops towards Baramulla. He lost his life in this bold venture.
In another bold move, Maj. Som Nath Sharma engaged the raiders at Badgam as they had reached very near the airport (November 3).
He was outnumbered seven to one. But he showed unbounded courage and inflicted heavy casualties on the enemy. He, too, lost his life.
When the raiders were on the outskirts of Srinagar and Lt. Col. Ranjit Rai and Maj. Som Nath Sharma of the Indian Army had been killed, Sardar Patel, accompanied by defence minister Baldev Singh, flew to the state capital, assessed the situation and on return to New Delhi ordered stoppage of all airline services and diversion of all planes for flying troops to Srinagar. The timely arrival of reinforcements enabled Brig. Sen to lure the raiders in the nest of Indian forces, near Shaltang, and attack them on November 5 from three sides. The raiders were routed.
The Pakistani raiders also made a determined bid to occupy Ladakh. But it was saved by the superior strategy and grit of the Indian military and Air Force. In this regard, two daring actions deserve special mention.
One was the amazing feat of Air Commodore Mehar Singh to fly his plane on May 24, 1948, at 23,000 feet above the sea level without oxygen on a hitherto unchartered course and land on the rough strip of Leh airport located at the height of 11,555 feet. This enabled the Indian forces to be airlifted to Leh and build up defence for Ladakh which was at the mercy of the enemy.
The second unique feat was of Major-General Thimayya who took his tanks to the snow-covered Zojila Pass at the height of 11,578 feet on November 1, 1948. General Thimayya’s feat has been compared to Hannibal crossing the Alps with his elephants. Till that time, no one in history had taken tanks to such a height in such hazardous conditions.
Along with triumphs, tragedies, unfortunately, continued. On October 28, the words, "Plebiscite under the UN auspices", were included in Nehru’s radio broadcast. Patel made a last-minute effort to secure the deletion of these word, but failed.
Another major mistake was committed when, on January 1, 1948, India took the case to the UN. Patel was so unhappy with Nehru’s and Mountbatten’s excessive regard for the UN that, in his private conversation, he spoke satirically about the "expertise of two great votaries of the UN in the Government of India".
As one looks at the events that happened over six decades ago, one is saddened to note that the nation has practically forgotten all its heroes on account of whose supreme sacrifices Kashmir could be saved for India. |
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