news details |
|
|
| Lessons from Lebanon | | Constraints of air power exposed | |
by Maj-Gen Ashok K. Mehta (retd)
IS it a coincidence that Israeli operations Summer Rain in Gaza and Change of Direction in Lebanon were triggered off in June and July by the Sunni Hamas and the Shia Hezbollah through killing and abduction of Israeli soldiers? No one knows yet, but a Shia-Sunni rapprochement may be in the offing. You have to be a rocket scientist to figure out how the Hezbollah had continued to fire rockets into Israel till the ceasefire despite hell being let loose on them by the Israeli defence forces (IDF).
The Hamas and the Hezbollah are synonymous with the deadly Kassam and Katyusha rockets they fire at Israeli cities. These abductions were not the first time that cross-border hostages had been taken. The one made famous happened on October 7, 2000, when the Hezbollah disguised as UN peacekeepers and using UN-marked vehicles captured three Israeli soldiers, apparently under the gaze of Indian peacekeepers who were made complicit by the Israeli media for not just colluding with but also video-filming the incident. But that is another story.
Israel has not fought an all-out war since its last invasion and occupation of southern Lebanon 18 years ago. Given its size, shape and unstable geographic location, Israel has had to keep its frontiers sanitised by annexation of territories on borders with all its neighbours. Later, it signed peace treaties with Egypt and Jordan, but is still in occupation of the Golan Heights in Syria. A variety of UN peacekeepers and observers are deployed to monitor all the borders.
The first military invasion called Operation Litani was launched in 1978 against the PLO in southern Lebanon which was called the Fatah land. The operation was designed to create a buffer upto the Litani river but it remained inconclusive. The United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) was born out of this war. In 1982, Mr Ariel Sharon had led Operation Peace For Galilee. The PLO along with Yasser Arafat was ejected from southern Lebanon. The Israeli forces withdrew in 2000 under intense public pressure.
In some ways, like cross-border terrorism in J&K, northern Israel has been subjected to periodic barrages of Katyusha rockets for many years, but for the first time many cities had to be evacuated this time.
Operation Change Of Direction envisaged two plans: Plan A, to create a buffer zone from 20 to 30 km up to the Litani river. Plan B was meant to create a buffer zone from 3.5 km to 7 km. What was played out was Plan B. Three divisions of the Israeli defence forces comprising 15,000 soldiers and air and naval forces were involved. The aim was to destroy the Hezbollah infrastructure and eliminate direct firing, rockets and small arms into northern Israel. Once this was achieved, the area was to be covered by fire without deployment of ground troops. Israel undertook 10,000 air sorties and attacked 4000 targets in Lebanon. It fired 50,000 artillery shells against rocket-launcher sites.
The Hezbollah is the pioneer of suicide bombings, and some of the most spectacular attacks against American targets in Lebanon have been attributed to it. The Hezbollah was raised in 1982 to oppose Israeli occupation of southern Lebanon. It is regarded as a state within a state. Its leader, Sheikh Hassan Nasrullah, has become a cult figure following the spectacular resistance put up against the Israeli forces.
A force of 5000 fighters is backed by 10000 reserves and a few hundred Iranian Revolutionary Guard members. It has a stock of 13,000 rockets of which 10,000 are short-range Katyushas made in China, Iran and Syria. The short-range rockets have a range of 20 to 40 km while the long-range ones have 50 to 80 km. They fired an average of 120 rockets daily for 34 days and used 4000 rockets of which half were long range. What is to be noted is that the Hezbollah targeted Israeli cities. For the first time since 1948, Haifa, the third largest city, came under rocket attacks.
More than a million people had to be evacuated. This has never happened before in Israel.
The Hezbollah’s aim in capturing Israeli soldiers was to trade them for two of its own prisoners, Samir Kuntar and Sheikh Abdul Karim Obeidi. Without Iran and Syria’s moral and material assistance, the Hezbollah could never stand up to Israel.
For three decades, southern Lebanon had been used as a base for proxy war. Both sides miscalculated the reaction of the other. That is why Hassan Nasrullah said that had he known it would lead to war, he would not have ordered the abductions. The Israelis have instituted a national commission to enquire into their failures in prosecuting the war.
Mr Ariel Sharon, still clinically alive, would never have walked into the Hezbollah trap. The losses inflicted on the Israeli forces in men and material are unprecedented. Used to decisive victories in less than 10 days, Israel struggled for 34 days without achieving its strategic objective of defanging the Hezbollah and freeing Israeli soldiers. For once, Israel has met its match in the Hezbollah.
Within the first 25 years of its existence, Israel fought and won three wars, all on more than one front. In the next 35 years, it fought several skirmishes in Lebanon till it finally withdrew in 2000 without ending cross-border Katyusha attacks. The Israeli youth and veterans of its defence forces are no longer conditioned for war, not the least asymmetric war.
Israel had painfully discovered the limits to its military power during Intifada I and II. The stark lesson from yet another shock and awe strategy in asymmetric war is that you have to fight a guerrilla like a guerrilla.
The Hezbollah has exposed the constraints of air power. The Israeli defence forces have lost their cutting edge. A reconfigured but meekly mandated UNIFIL is no guarantee for peace and stability.
From skirmishing with the Hamas in Gaza, Operation Change of Direction was meant to be a 180-degree turn to the north against the Hezbollah and regarded a cake-walk. On its path, the Hezbollah has altered the strategic contours of the region. Shia-Sunni cooperation in the region against a common enemy is not unlikely.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| |
| |
|
|
|
|
 |
|
|
