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| Indo-Pak ceasefire under strain | | | Nirbhay Jammual
It is almost pre-2003 situation in the Indian subcontinent.It is similar to the one that existed before India and Pakistan ageed on ceasefire on the LOC.The Mumbai carnage has placed both Delhi and Islamabad on pins.While in Pakistan senior Army functionaries have been visiting the forward areas more frequently in recent days than in the past with the purpose of keeping the troops fit and fine to meet any challenge from its immediate neighbour,in India security and the intelligence agencies seem to be on their toes drafting and redrafting the plan for securing airports in the country against any terrorist strike or against any aircraft hijacking bid.High alert has been sounded on all the major and small airports where the security grid has been further strengthened following intelligence inputs indicating the plan of terrorists to hijack some plane.The memories of the Mumbai mayhem are so fresh with people that aeroplane passengers no longer protest or resent the discomfort caused to them by the security forces while subjecting the luggage to a thorough checkup.
The growing tension between Delhi and Islamabad has forced the Indian authorities to beef up the security system on the railway platforms and on the rail tracks.The much frequented malls,shopping centres,hospitals,religious places,including mosques,temples,Gurdwaras and churches,have been kept under scanner.The security personnel deployed in the crowded places have been told to wear an eagle's eye so that no terrorist was able to roam as freely as those who pounded the Taj,the Oberio and the Nariman buildings with gunfire and grenades.Well the exercise being undertaken by various Government agencies cannot be expected to be so much foolproof that even a single terrorist is unable to move from one place to the other.Here I am reminded of an old saying "a moment for a thief to strike,a full day for the keeper to keep a watch."This saying fits well with what has happened and will be happening so long terrorists continue to receive moral and material support from agencies across the border.In fact the modernisation of the communication system,especially in the field of mobile services,has facilitated the task of terrorists in remaining in touch with their patrons within India and across the border.Those who doubt it need to take note of the way the terrorists,who carried out the carnage in Mumbai,had a number of cell phones and several SIM cards which they had procured in West Bengal and Delhi before making way to Mumbai.
Al these developments have resulted in the US mediation between India and and Pakistan on the need for averting an armed conflict.Despite the fact that the US leadership has told Pakistan to deal firmly with terrorists and cooperate with India in the investigation on the Mumbai attack,Islamabad does not seem prepred to accept any dictation from Delhi.This became evident when the Pakistan President,Asif Ali Zardari,announced that Pakistan will not handover Hafiz,Azhar,Dawood and other 18 terrorits as demanded by India.During her recent visit to the subcontinent the US secretary of State,Condeleezza Rice clearly unfolded the US policy on India-Pakistan relations.While she suggested to Pakistan to cooperate with India in the investigation and in destroing the terrorist camps,she advised Delhi not to launch any attack on Pakistan which could "provoke unintended consequences."The US military commanders,now on visit to Pakistan,have suggested to Islamabad to broaden its anti-Jehadi campaign.Well experience says that Pakistan has neither been sincere in intensifying operations against terrorists nor is it in a position to launch an anti-terrorist campaign on a massive scale as such a step could invite more trouble for the establishment in Islamabad.Hence Pakistani establishment finds it safe to launch a cosmetic campaign against terrorists.The same cosmetic approach was adopted while assuring the US President George Bush of Islamabads support to him on tackling the menace of terrorism. |
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