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| Ringside view of a continuing impasse | | A civil servant’s first-hand account of the Kashmir imbroglio testifying to his enduring love affair with the State | | BALRAJ PURI
MY KASHMIR — Conflict and the Prospects for Enduring Peace: Wajahat Habibullah; United States Institute of Peace, 1200, 17th Street NW, Suite 200, Washington DC 20036-3011.
The title of Wajahat Habibullah’s book My Kashmir indicates his love affair with Kashmir, which he acknowledges is reciprocated by its people. It started in 1969 when he was posted as an IAS officer to the State. Since then, according to him, his “love for Kashmiris has grown.” He served the State first as a Sub-Divisional Officer, then as a Deputy Commissioner and finally as the Divisional Commissioner for Kashmir Division.
He cites many incidents to show how helpless the civil authority was in dealing with police and other security forces. He had to arrange a “public meeting” for women Gandhian workers with government clerks and policeman in civil dress in the audience. This was the pattern for organising celebrations of Independence Day and Republic Day. This demonstrated how much the government was isolated from the people till Sheikh Abdullah returned to power in the State in 1975. With a short stint in New Delhi in the Central Secretariat during 1982-90, he returned to the State Services. His otherwise brilliant career was somewhat stigmatised when his report on the shocking incident of gang rape of 23 women in Kunan Poshipura on February 23-24, 1991 was released by the government, after deleting his misgivings and giving a clean chit to the army.
Instant hero
But he soon had an opportunity to more than regain his popularity. His success in getting the siege of the most sacred shrine of Kashmir, the Hazratbal, by the militants in October 1993 vacated without shedding any blood and damage to the shrine was the crowning glory of his career in Kashmir. On November 16, a military truck rammed into the car in which Wajahat and General Zaki, then advisor to the Governor, were travelling, seriously injuring Wajahat. It was interpreted by the public as a deliberate attempt on his life, as the army was supposed to be unhappy over his handling of the Hazratbal crisis. The incident made him an instant hero in Kashmir. In order to recover from his injuries and for proper treatment, he had to leave Kashmir.
After his recovery he had a number of assignments outside the State. But his services continued to be used by the Government of India for back channel talks with the separatist leaders, from Atal Behari Vajpayee to Manmohan Singh.
Hazratbal siege
While the account of his role as an administrator is authentic and admirable, he relies on secondary sources which are less reliable, for his treatment of the Kashmir problem, to which the major part of the book is devoted. There are, for instance, some glaring factual errors. Arrest of Sheikh Abdullah in 1953, according to him, was provoked by his meeting with China’s Prime Minister Chou-en-Lai. The fact is that their meeting took place in 1965 and cannot be linked with Sheikh’s arrest 12 years ago. Similarly, the agitation for recovery of the sacred relic, which was mysteriously removed from the Hazratbal Shrine in the end of 1963, had nothing to do with Operation Gibraltar launched by Pakistan in 1965. On my request, Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru sent his confidant Lal Bahadur Shastri to Kashmir where he succeeded in resolving the differences between the Relic Action Committee and the Home Ministry officials. People hailed the role of Shastri and shouted slogans in favour of Nehru.
The Pakistan sponsored attack was provoked by the integration of the State with the Union by the leftist government of Sadiq, supported by post- Nehru leadership. The angry Kashmir mood tempted Pakistan to send armed infiltrations to the State. Again, it is not true that the Muslim Conference, mainly based in Jammu, supported the State’s accession to Pakistan. It supported the Maharaja’s aspiration to remain independent.
Peace initiative
As far as the author’s views on the Kashmir problem are concerned, he takes little notice of the aspirations of the non-Kashmiri speaking communities in the State who outnumber Kashmiris. Lack of a serious attempt to reconcile the aspirations of the ethnic communities of the State is responsible for many a complication in the Kashmir problem.
The author acknowledges Sajad Lone’s vision as a welcome initiative. The operative part of his documents is that the non-Muslim part of the State would have the option to opt out. Any division of the State on religious lines, which Sajad’s vision implies, would threaten the secular character of the State and the rest of India, as also the unique cultural heritage of the Kashmir region. Rejecting the idea of an independent Kashmir, he observes, “Located in volatile region amid rival nuclear powers and smaller states in conflict, the state is hardly likely to be left free.” He adds “dictatorships and quislings are inevitable.” He concludes, “Freedom can be achieved while retaining the territorial integrity of both India and Pakistan, with the present boundaries becoming soft borders.” Would this solution be acceptable to the separatist leaders?
On the whole, Wajahat’s sincere efforts to reconcile his commitment to “the idea of Indian nation” with “service to the people of the State” are commendable. |
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