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| Disaster Follows Disaster in Absence of Accountability | | |
Ashok Kapur
The Intelligence Bureau, which is the domestic counterpart of the foreign intelligence agency, still retains its basic structure of a directorate but only in form. The head of the directorate has been conferred the status of a “secretary” to the Government of India. By another silent stroke of the pen, it has virtually broken free of the controlling ministry.
The results are again before us. Civil society seethes in impotent rage. Disaster follows disaster on account of serial intelligence failures. The agency is routinely accused of issuing intelligence alerts, mostly non-specific information that is hardly “actionable.” These are issued generally before important national days and festivals when there is a possibility of terror attacks. These require little field work, and are meant to serve as safe alibis in the event of actual attacks. Obviously, no accountability can be fastened on anyone.
Once field directorates get habituated to bypass the controlling ministries, the temptation to have direct political linkages is all too irresistible. The heads of directorates brief the ministers directly. Ironically, it is a disservice to the latter. For the minister loses the benefit of advice of his own ministry which alone can objectively evaluate and assess the directorate’s input, specifically its worth, accuracy and reliability. After all, the “user” of the input is the controlling ministry which alone is responsible for policy-making.
Systematic failure
The nation is suffering on account of this systemic failure. While the recent serial intelligence failures are in the public domain, it has now surfaced that the Sri Lanka fiasco, in which our Army suffered several thousand casualties, was a direct result of the systemic malfunction. We now have it on the authority of the former top cop ~ almost ~ that the then intelligence chiefs were quite habituated to routinely bypass the “user” ministries, in this case the foreign ministry. The ruling political executive, at the time of the Sri Lanka misadventure, was relatively young and inexperienced. It was misguided. The rest, as they say, is history. No intelligence heads rolled. Heads were only severed ~ several hundred of them of the brave Indian soldiers.
Unmindful of the lack of coordination and poor results, the government has created the post of National Security Adviser to the Prime Minister. A square peg has been rammed down a round hole. The current incumbent is a long-retired police officer. He reports directly to the PM. Theoretically, he can bypass any cabinet minister. Unelected and unaccountable, it reminds us of the courtesan of yore ~ authority without accountability.
With a police officer as NSA, civil society suffers a triple whammy, so to speak. National security is a broad concept. It encompasses a comprehensive knowledge of foreign affairs, international law, military strategy, diplomacy and overall constitutional functioning and policy-making. By posting a police officer as NSA the government has, perhaps unwittingly, reduced the concept to a ridiculous level. After all, a police officer’s entire expertise is limited to collection of field intelligence and criminal investigation. Nothing more.
Secondly, the NSA, reportedly, has some outfits directly reporting to him. This is in addition to a multiplicity of agencies dealing with the subject and supposed to report to other ministries. Confusion is worse confounded. In organisational terms, it is a dysfunctional arrangement. A multi-member body cannot be supervised by an individual, howsoever “competent” he may be. This is empire-building in an age when empires are out of fashion.
Little wonder, therefore, that the largest number of terrorist attacks and the maximum casualties have occurred during the tenure of the current incumbent. Organisationally, the post of NSA is an extra-constitutional one. He heads neither a department nor a directorate. A dysfunctional cog in the functioning of the cabinet, and departments and ministries headed by accountable ministers. As the NSA has reportedly been advising the Prime Minister directly, he is functioning as a kind of super Home Minister. Even after the Mumbai outrage, the NSA marches on whereas his “junior”, Mr Shivraj Patil, had to resign.
After each terrorist outrage, there is a chorus of protests from some police officers on the need to have a tough “anti-terror law”. This argument is not valid. Terrorism cannot be “prevented” by law. It can only be prevented by reliable and timely intelligence. Gathering of intelligence feedback is a laborious process. For all the technological advance, human beings are still the primary source of intelligence. This is the lesson of 9/11.
Intelligence can primarily be sourced from potential enemies by infiltrating their ranks and winning their confidence. It presupposes an honesty of purpose and sustained field work. As terrorist attacks are not being pre-empted by our intelligence agencies, the problem is reduced to a question of prosecuting the offenders successfully. The existing penal laws are more than sufficient for the purpose. Terrorist attacks are planned in the dark and executed by stealth. The code defines this as criminal conspiracy. 26/11 witnessed a murderous assault on security forces, a virtual war against the state, punishable by death. Even an attempt or abetment is similarly punishable. This presupposes fair and meticulous investigation. A tall order indeed, considering the success rate of criminal prosecution in the country.
Accountability needed
RAW suffers from another shortcoming. It has formed its own officers’ cadre, designed to man all senior positions, including staff posts. This will render the outfit even more ineffective. The core strength of an intelligence outfit is its ability to work undercover. Its senior cadres should be drawn mainly from outside the organisation.
An intelligence officer is effective as long as his real identity is under wraps. Once the wrap is blown off, he is of little use to the outfit. The advantage of having outsiders, at least in senior positions, is that they can always be reverted and fresh faces inducted. But if an insider’s cover is off, he becomes a total liability. RAW is moving tiptoe towards such a disaster, almost unnoticed.
In sum, unless some form of accountability is enforced, the organisation restructured and controls re-established, the situation will not improve. This is the universal experience. The CIA, the American counterpart of RAW, is invariably headed by an “outsider”. Admiral Turner was inducted by the then US President to head the CIA. His candid insight and experience is most instructive for India’s intelligence outfits. “Unfortunately, when individuals working amidst all the temptations of secret intelligence know they will not be held accountable, mistakes are likely ... controls are necessary for the good of our intelligence.”
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