news details |
|
|
| What PM told us on the N-deal | | |
- By Dr A. Gopalakrishnan
On August 26, 2006 Prime Minister Manmohan Singh met with seven senior nuclear scientists for a discussion on the Indo-US nuclear cooperation deal. The group of scientists comprised three former chairmen of the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC), one former chairman of the Atomic Energy Regulatory Board (AERB), one former director of Bhabha Atomic Research Centre (BARC), one former CMD of the Nuclear Power Corporation (NPC) and a former Director of the Indira Gandhi Centre for Atomic Research (IGCAR). Along with the PM, the national security adviser, the principal secretary to the PM, the chairman of the AEC, the principal scientific adviser to the PM, the minister of state in the PMO, and a few other senior officials were also present. The meeting involved a very cordial and useful exchange among all present, and it lasted for about 90 minutes. In the end, the scientists expressed their thanks to the PM for inviting them to meet him and for allowing each of them sufficient time for a very candid expression of views.
The PM, at the outset, assured us that he would not, as Prime Minister, take any action which would weaken the nation’s strength or harm its indigenous R&D pursuits. He said he understood our concerns from the letter we had jointly addressed to parliamentarians, and he wanted each one of us in turn to explain to him the specific thoughts each might have on various aspects of this deal. He hoped that each of us, in due course, would also help the government in finding an acceptable path to take full advantage of the opportunities available through this deal, and at the same time identify the potential pitfalls that are to be avoided in doing this, and provide suggestions on how to avert these adverse impacts.
It will not be proper on my part to give a verbatim report on the proceedings of a meeting chaired by the PM, to which we had the privilege of being invited by him. Neither do I wish to take on any self-assigned responsibility of representing the views of the other scientists who participated in this meeting. Instead, the attempt here is to give a summary of my own understanding and analysis of where we stand on this nuclear deal, based partly on the exchange of views at the PM’s meeting, but also on several other discussions I have had recently with senior officials.
The government, as I understand, is firmly opposed to any direct or indirect attempt by the United States to limit or slow down the fissile material production in the country. Similarly, India is opposed to the imposition of any curbs on the further expansion of our strategic nuclear programme. It is clear that any clauses in the final US legislation which may directly or indirectly contradict these stands will become "deal breakers."
Another crucial issue is that of India retaining the flexibility to conduct further nuclear weapon tests, in case the future strategic environment necessitates such tests in the interest of our national security. The government appears to concede that such a future need cannot be ruled out, and this is the reason for its repeated emphasis on a "voluntary" moratorium on testing. It is also clear to the government that the final US legislation will most likely dictate the stoppage of the Indo-US nuclear deal in case of an Indian nuclear weapon test. The counter-measures which the government has in mind include a carefully chosen path of development, wherein there will be built-in strategies to withstand the adverse impacts of the US and NSG reactions following a test. These shall also include, but not be limited to, the following precautionary steps which must be part of the modified US law and/or the yet to be signed bilateral 123-Agreement, and the US Congress and its administration must understand that non-inclusion of any of these covering provisions in the final legislation will indeed constitute a "deal breaker."
If the deal is cancelled due to any reason, we need to prevent the stoppage of life-time fuel and spare-parts supplies for reactors and equipment which India might have already imported up to that time. For this purpose, a set of multiple alternative schemes for facilitating the procurement of these items have been worked out and these have been included in the mutually agreed separation plan in March 2006. Stock-piling of such items should be one of the flexibilities made available to India though the government is sensitive to the associated inventory-carrying costs and the burden this will add to nuclear electricity prices. Nevertheless, at this stage, we need to ensure that the US Congress concurs with these parallel supply options and that they agree to retain these in the revised US legislation.
As it stands, the US Atomic Energy Act will require that India will have to return all US equipment and materials supplied to all civilian facilities under this deal, including the spent-fuel and any plutonium extracted from that, in case the nuclear cooperation is terminated. India certainly cannot agree with this requirement. Suitable waiver of this clause in the US Atomic Energy Act will therefore have to be sought in the reconciled version of the legislation.
If the cooperation is terminated by the US while we are in the middle of executing a joint project, the US cannot be allowed to abandon the half-finished project and walk away. The revised legislation must ensure that the US will have the obligation to provide materials and assistance as originally envisaged, not only to complete the project but also to provide lifetime fuel and spare-parts supplies for such facilities.
As for the disposition of the spent-fuel arising from the use of imported natural or enriched uranium in our civilian reactors, the government’s position is that India must retain full rights to reprocess that fuel in India, under safeguards, and use the extracted plutonium in civilian breeders or AHWRs. This provision has to be written into the legislation, since there will be no question of India asking for US permission to do such reprocessing, on a case to case basis.
Both the IAEA safeguards agreement and the Additional Protocol (AP) will be negotiated as India-specific documents. Government appears to have the full assurance of the IAEA director general that he will help India frame these as close as possible to the corresponding agreements applicable to the nuclear weapon states under the NPT. How far the IAEA board will go along with this is to be seen in due course. Though not confirmed, it would appear that if the supply of fuel and spare-parts to a set of imported reactors is stopped on the cessation of nuclear cooperation under this legislation, despite the alternative options built into the separation plan, India will insist on the right to withdraw forthwith all such facilities from the IAEA safeguards and the Additional Protocol. In other words, no fuel and spare parts, no further safeguards inspections or return of assets bought and paid for prior to that, while under safeguards! It is necessary that the government incorporates this stipulation in both the 123 Agreement and the agreements which we sign with the IAEA. It is also clear that the separation plan will not involve the bifurcation of personnel into some who can work only in military projects and programmes and others who can be employed only in civilian projects and programmes. Also, the safeguards and the AP will be effective only prospectively, with India not being obliged to discuss past issues regarding any facility we decide to place on the civilian side.
The stated position of the PM on full civil nuclear cooperation is clear from his addresses to Parliament. He has said that, "We will not agree to any dilution that would prevent us from securing the benefits of full civil cooperation." In my view, it would be sufficient if the revised legislation does not specifically bar full civilian cooperation for India, as the current bill does. The NSG is seriously reframing its rules on transfer of enrichment and reprocessing technologies to all countries, and notwithstanding what the US and India may agree on this, eventually the NSG decision will override any bilateral understanding.
At the end of our meeting, the PM made it quite clear that he did not view imports as substituting domestic efforts in any way. He gave the assurance that the domestic R&D programmes and their utilisation, especially in the three-stage nuclear power programme and the scaling-up of clean-coal technologies for power generation, will be pushed forward with no impediment. He closed his remarks by saying that it was his intention that dialogues of this nature (the one he had with the scientists) would become part of the regular process until India eventually reached a decision on the Indo-US nuclear deal. The responsibility to follow up on this intention of the PM was entrusted to the national security adviser and the secretary, DAE.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| |
| |
|
|
|
|
 |
|
|
