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| When Pramod Mahajan acted like a censor | | High-profile George Fernades was ridiculed in 1999 | |
B L KAK
NEW DELHI, SEPT. 30: George Fernandes, India's Defence Minister during the Kargil war of 1999, was forced to keep quiet after his Ministerial colleague, Pramod Mahajan, put his foot down, rejecting the use of the former's interview by official media, All India Radio (AIR) and Doordarshan. Fernandes did not protest when Mahajan, then Minister of Information and Broadcasting (I&B), acted like a censor.
This revelation is contained in a book titled 'Kargil: Inside Story'. Authored by AK Chakraborty, a Delhi-based journalist, the 219-page book says that an interesting aspect of offical media coverage was that the Minister of I&B, Pramod Mahajan, acted like a censor. Mahajan wanted various interviews on Kargil to be shown to him before being telecast. And Mahajan, according to the book, had issued "verbal" instructions to AIR and DD (Doordarshan) that they "must" consult him beforfe any "controversial or critcal" observations of Defence Minister, George Fernandes are allowed to go on AIR or state-run Doordarshan.
Printed and published by Trishul Publications, the book reveals that one interview of George Fernandes was not permitted to be telecast on June 14, 1999. Pramod Mahajan called for the tapes of this interview and after viewing it, directed the Doordarshan authorities not to use it. Fernandes came to know about it but "strangely did not protest", the book says, adding: "Such was the communication gap between the Defence Minister of the country and the Minister for Information and Broadcasting on such a crucial national issue like fighting the enemy in Kargil".
AK Chakraborty has thrown up a relevant question: When the media is sought as a 'force multiplier' and when the nation faces a war or war-like situation, why can't arrangements be made for keeping dedicated aircraft or helicopter for the media to play its legitimate role? Chakraborty's pronouncement: "It is a shame that no 'press party' was taken by the Ministry of Defence for covering Kargil during the entire operations from May 26 to July 17, 1999". The first conducted press party was taken on July 21 and the second press party on July 23....Pakistan on the other hand had taken a number of press teams to the forward areas by then".
It is obvious someone in the hierarchy either at the Ministry of Defence or the Service Headquarters could not appreciate the requirements of Information Warfare or wanted to avoid media asking too many questions. In any future operations, defence services will have to take into account the requirements of the media and mark some reserve airlift for journalists to enable them to reach the press camps. And the book points out that the government can take advantage of the counter insurgency (CI) operations in Jammu and Kashmir and other areas and experiment with 'mobile press camps'. This, the book opines, will provide opportunity for journalists to undergo battle innoculation and understand the organisational and rank structure of the Services better.
According to the book, hundreds of crores of rupees have been "wasted on misuse of transport aircraft and helicopters" by various Defence Ministers of India, including Mulayam Singh Yadav. Mulayam Yadav was reported to have spent a whopping sum of Rs 42 crores on purely political visits to various places in Uttar Pradesh (UP) and other areas of the country. "To plead that not even a single aircraft was available for press party to Srinagar (during the Kargil war) was sheer absurdity", the book said and added: "Likewise the government makes available mobile OB vans for coverage of cricket tournaments but when an important even and a challenge like Kargil arose, the Doordarshan authorities were found wanting".
The 'persistent complaint of the sour-grapes brigade' in Delhi has been that far too many reporters on the frontline (Kargil) were much too young, and inexperienced. Chakraborty's questions are loaded with sarcasm: "So couldn't we have sent slightly more seasoned (read older) people instead? Now, why does the Army send lieutenats and captains in their early twenties to assault these peaks? Why can't it send more experienced people, colonels and brigadiers instead?
The book has this piece of advice for the Army authorities: Just as hand-to-hand combat is best left to young men, covering it is best left to young reporters.
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