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| The long-drawn Naga dialogue | | |
M.S. Prabhakara
Does the process of talks between the Government and the NSCN(I-M) take into account the pressures and compulsions of the parties concerned?
NSCN (I-M) cadres at their headquarters at Hebron 40 km from Dimapur.
HAVE THE talks between the Government of India and the National Socialist Council of Nagaland (Isak-Muivah) once again failed or, at the most optimistic, ended in yet another impasse?
The general impression is that the latest round of talks, the third this year, held in Amsterdam (October 17-19) made little headway. Questioning "India's sincerity" in the matter, Thuingaleng Muivah, the NSCN(I-M) general secretary, had said several times in the last nine years of ceasefire and talks that the outfit may "walk away" if the Government failed to honour its own commitments, with the unspoken but obvious threat that there would be no further extension of ceasefire. The point was tellingly made in January last year when the ceasefire, extended yearly ever since it came into force in 1997, was extended only by six months. The ceasefire that expired on July 31 has again been extended only by six months, at the insistence of the NSCN(I-M).
As during the earlier rounds of talks, a major point of negotiation continues to be the form and content of the `special federal relationship' between `India' and `Nagaland,' as envisaged by the NSCN(I-M).
The broad contours of such a relationship were explained in an interview to the BBC by Mr. Muivah in April last year. The most significant point that emerged from that interview (though not spelt out in so many words) was that the NSCN(I-M), while not abandoning its fundamental objective of a sovereign Nagalim, would for the present focus instead on the territorial integration of the Naga-inhabited areas into one political structure. There was not even a hint of a trade-off between sovereignty and territoriality; and given the circumstance, the issue remained vague. However, such an inference was inescapable.
The most interesting aspect of this seeming shift, and the insistence that the Government of India should initiate immediate practical steps towards such a territorial integration, was, and continues to be, that such a restructured Nagaland (or Nagalim) could only be created under the provisions of the Indian Constitution, and the political legitimacy of such a structure too would be derived from the Indian Constitution. These aspects of the contradictions were not expanded upon.
The NSCN(I-M), which even now formally rejects the Indian Constitution, maintains that under the envisaged "special relationship," India and Nagalim would mutually recognise each other's Constitution. The last couple of rounds of talks have apparently been examining other instances of federal states whose constituents have their own Constitutions. The most recent such arrangement is democratic South Africa whose Constitution provides for the individual provinces to have their own constitutions, though till now only KwaZulu-Natal has exercised that option.
It is not surprising that after a dozen or so rounds of talks, so little progress has been made on the core issues of sovereignty and territoriality, as posited by the NSCN(I-M). Integration of the Naga-inhabited areas outside the present Nagaland into a Nagalim simply means an impossible task of squaring the circle. Such an exercise, involving the diminution of the present territories of Arunachal Pradesh, Assam, and Manipur, would lead to stoking fires that are already very nearly uncontrollable, especially in Manipur. Concessions on sovereignty, or even allowing for "asymmetrical federalism," are problematic given the existence of other autonomist and separatist movements in the region, some of which are potentially secessionist, like the two explicitly secessionist movements in Manipur and Assam. Indeed, given the recrudescence of regional chauvinisms in so many so-called mainstream areas (Karnataka is the latest example), such experimentations in the volatile periphery of the Indian state seem unlikely.
At one level, it is good that the Government of India and the NSCN(I-M) are talking, even if often using an idiom and making points that the other side pretends not to understand. Yes, again and again, both sides present and defend their respective positions, only to meet six months later to repeat the exercise. While jaw-jaw is always preferable to war-war, such normative wisdom fails to take into account the pressures and compulsions of the parties concerned. In the present instance, the dilemma of the NSCN(I-M) is both acute and irresolvable, for it cannot, unlike the Government of India, play the game indefinitely.
If this deadlock that has now become a permanent feature is not broken, will the NSCN(I-M) "walk away," as its leaders have more than once said? After the latest round of talks, two spokespersons of the organisation came out with two slightly different responses. A PTI report, quoting Karaiba Chawang, said the talks had entered into the "deepest stage" and hoped that "something concrete may come out in the next two to three rounds of dialogue on substantive issues." However, a Reuters report, quoting Rh. Raising, the self-styled NSCN(I-M) foreign minister said: "India is trying to test our patience by prolonging the peace process. Such attitude of the Indian government will put at risk all peace initiatives in the region."
The point made by Mr. Raising is interesting. The NSCN(I-M) and its supporters have always tried to promote a reading of the Naga insurgency as one that is the mother of all insurgencies in the region; and further, were a settlement with the NSCN(I-M) clinched, other insurgencies too would sue for peace.
This was perhaps so once upon a time, but such correlation does not exist now. At least one important insurgent group, the United National Front of Manipur (UNLF), has drawn "salutary" lessons from these never-ending talks and has refused ever to enter into negotiations on the issue of Manipur's sovereignty. The path it has chosen is one of popular mobilisation in support of sovereignty through a programme of plebiscites at the village level; and proceed further on the basis of that feedback.
Despair, threat, and hope. They are all there at the end of every round of talks. It is always rash to predict the future. However, after a decade of peace, it will not be easy for the NSCN(I-M) to go back to insurgency.
Important gains
Moreover, the NSCN(I-M) has no cause to "go away," howsoever its leaders may feel frustrated at what they say is lack of progress — not to speak of "India's insincerity." The reality on the ground is the NSCN(I-M) has made enormous gains in the interregnum.
The most important of this is the reality of a de facto Government of the Peoples' Republic of Nagalim, a well-entrenched functioning structure. The GPRN, an acronym as widely used and understood as GOI, is an irreversible gain, from which other concomitant gains have followed. It has all the appurtenances of a legitimate state, with well-oiled home and finance departments. It collects taxes (not extortion, in its view), its `crime suppression department' maintains law and order, its directives are followed; it is indeed deeply embedded according to urban wisdom within the State government as well.
Whatever its own strength, both the State and Union Governments are complicit in its existence. Indeed, it is difficult to believe that any decision affecting Nagaland can be taken either by the State government or the Union government without some reference to the GPRN.
Dimapur is perhaps the best place to understand this reality. There was a time when Dimapur, Nagaland's railhead and the only city where the Inner Line Regulations that require all non-Nagas to secure a permit to enter the state do not apply, was thus very much an `open city', with all the promises and perils that the expression implies. Since the NSCN(I-M) formally returned to Nagaland and established its headquarters near Dimapur, life in the city has become quite orderly. Casual workers who would earlier move to Dimapur and eventually make a permanent home in the city, sometimes by entering into opportunistic marriages, now require a residence permit that is issued by the NSCN(I-M) under its imprint. A fee of Rs.250 is charged for the permit, a laminated document carrying the photograph of the applicant, which is valid for six months and is renewable.
This is no small achievement. No wonder, therefore, that the NSCN(I-M), over and beyond its rhetoric, has adopted an incremental approach in its quest for sovereignty and territoriality. Seen in this perspective, the seemingly inexhaustible patience over the issue of sovereignty and the urgency over the issue of territoriality are both understandable.
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