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| Balance of power game | | There is a lot to learn from China | |
by K. Subrahmanyam
THIS is the age of balance of power. No major power identifies any of the others as an adversary. They deal with each other politically, economically and strategically to maximise one’s own national interest in the international system. This point has been emphasised often by Prime Minister Manmohan Singh.
However, sections of our political class are still unable to shed the shibboleths of the Cold War bipolar era. They continue to expect the major nations of the world to fall into black and white categories and the evolution of international politics on predictable ideological lines. While the bipolar approach to international relations almost puts a country on autopilot in the conduct of its foreign policy, the balance of power game demands independent scrutiny of each major development and determination of the country’s policy to maximise its self-interest.
In this respect there is a lot to be learnt from China whose President will be visiting India in the third week of November. There is an unnecessary debate on whether President Hu Jintao should be allowed to address the joint session of our Parliament. The issue ought to have been decided quietly in consultation with the Chinese establishment to the best of India’s interests. If the Chinese, who do not have a democratically elected legislature, would feel honoured to have their President addressing the joint session of our parliament that would be to India’s interest and should be done.
Indian Parliament is a part of India’s political culture and we should feel proud to show it to the visiting Chinese President as we do in respect of the Taj Mahal. The problem arises only when we interpret a dignitary’s address to the joint session of Parliament as endorsement of his democratic credentials. Since in India there is general acceptance of the view that democracy cannot be exported, there should be no expectation that heads of state or government invited to address the joint session should be from a practising democracy. That would be mixing up ideology with international politics, which is counterproductive in a balance of power system.
The essence of the balance of power system is how to leverage the relationships with other balancers to maximise the return from the major power we are dealing with. In other words, India should be able to leverage its relationship with China to enhance its returns from its relationship with the US and vice-versa. The US and China are not adversaries but rivals and, therefore, are capable of being handled in this manner. Mr Hu Jintao was in the US and at that stage concluded deals with the US worth tens of billions of dollars. Now during his visit to France, he has attempted to leverage that relationship with the French along with the sweetness of buying 170 Airbus aircraft over a period of time, to persuade French President Jacques Chirac to come out against the continuance of European arms embargo on China.
At the same time, China took a stand on the merits on the North Korean nuclear test and joined the other permanent members of the UN Security Council in condemning the test and on formal imposition of sanctions on North Korea. They did not take the line that they should not be seen to be towing the US and Western line on North Korea or even Iran. No doubt, their going along with the US is a nuanced move, but they are not afraid to go along with the US if they consider that it would suit their interests. They are keenly aware of the fact that a rigid anti-US policy, which will be predictable, will not give them as much leverage vis-à-vis the US, Japan or even Russia as a flexible policy in which decisions will be made on a case-by-case basis to serve China’s national interest.
Therefore, it does not make sense to have a non-flexible policy vis-à-vis any of the other major powers in the balance of power system — the US, the European Union and Russia, with whom India has a strategic partnership, and with Japan and China, with whom India is conducting a strategic dialogue with the hope of converting it to strategic partnership in the near future.
In the balance of power game where major powers have developed a stake in international stability, even internal weaknesses are often used as bargaining chips in developing relations with other major powers. China offers its concern for internal stability as an excuse not to push through certain reforms. Similarly, Pakistan too leverages its domestic vulnerability to jehadism to resist too much external pressure. Unlike China and Pakistan, India is a democracy and is in a better position to leverage its domestic pressures which are transparently visible to drive harder bargains with other powers interested in enhancing their relationship with India and in consolidating certain political preferences. In that sense, the lobbying of the leftists in India in favour of China can easily become an effective bargaining leverage for the Indian establishment vis-à-vis the US.
Similarly, India needs enhanced relationship with the US to bargain effectively with China. It is no coincidence that both Indo-US and Indo-Chinese relations have been progressing reasonably well over the last two years.
Gen Pervez Musharraf has understood the art of using leverages in the game of balance of power. Though there are many in this country who feel that in today’s international politics there has to be a choice between the US and China, General Musharraf has managed to be an all-weather friend of China, a beneficiary of its missile and nuclear weapon technologies, its arms supplies and its major projects such as the Karakoram Highway, Gwadar port and Chashma nuclear power plants and, at the same time, a recipient of large-scale military and economic aid from the US and an ally in the war on terror. His successful performance does not fit in with the ideological framework of those who argue that the beneficial relationship with the US or China has to be at the expense of the relationship with the other party.
In fact, during the fifties and the sixties, India successfully dealt with the US and the USSR and derived aid from both. Nonalignment was the balance of power in a bipolar world and a very useful strategy and instrument of policy. This basic rationale of non-alignment was lost and it degenerated into a nonflexible ideology in the last three decades. Now it is necessary to rediscover it and apply it in a more sophisticated manner in the multi-polar world.
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