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| Guns alone don't win wars | | |
NATO is facing adversities in Afghanistan because other allies are objecting to the manner and place of its troop deployment, says Anil Bhat
In a ceremony in Kabul on October 5, command of international military security operations in eastern Afghanistan was formally handed over to NATO's International Security Assist-ance Force (ISAF), effectively placing responsibility for security operations throughout Afghanistan under NATO command.
As a result of this decision, nearly 12,000 US troops have joined their NATO counterparts in the International Security Assistance Force under NATO Regional Command East, bringing the total numbers of NATO's ISAF force to roughly 33,000 troops from 37 Nations. Eight thousand US troops will remain under the US command to continue counter-terrorism operations and the provision of support to reconstruction, training and equipping of the Afghan National Army and Afghan National Police.
The mission is the biggest ground combat operation in NATO's history and gives Lt Gen David Richards, a British officer who commands NATO's 32,000 troops the largest number of US troops under a foreign leader since World War II.
The change of command and composition of forces comes at a time when the Taliban in Afghanistan is resurging after lying low for five years, which is only one part of NATO's problem. The other major problem is the restrictions, which the contributing countries have imposed on the modus of employing their contingents.
According to USA Today report (September 29), these restrictions, also called caveats, vary and have been imposed by nations who fear body-bags, disagree with some or the other aspect of the unenviable task at hand, or because their troops lack training or equipment. One major disadvantage is that some of them cannot fight at night or in the most dangerous parts of Afghanistan. All these factors make a force commander's task very difficult.
Only six out of the 26 contributing countries have not placed any restrictions on how or where their troops are deployed. The warfare in Afghanistan is a deadly mix of the asymmetrical, unconventional and unpredictable to say the least. The harsh terrain, lack of development and resources, as well as language and cultural differences only compound the problem.
The Taliban have increasingly adopted the tactics of Iraqi insurgents, using car and roadside bombs to launch attacks. The number of suicide bombings has gone up by 400 per cent and roadside bombs have more than doubled.
For troops of many of the countries the warfare in Afghanistan is an absolutely new ball game - a deadly mix of the asymmetrical, unconventional and unpredictable to say the least. The harsh terrain, lack of development and resources, as well as language and cultural differences only compound the problem. With all these problems comes the major Pakistan factor of a treacherous ally hunting with the hounds and running with the hares - that it is in cahoots with.
The other Pakistan factor is its desperate attempts to keep India, an old friend of Afghanistan, out of the peacekeeping efforts there. Indian Army has the experience and expertise to deal with all the aspects of warfare as originating in Afghanistan, thanks to Pakistan Army's six decades worth of Kashmir-related anti-India fixation, which deprived Pakistan as a new and growing nation a large and undisclosed amounts of finances which should have been used for its development, rather than hate campaigns and conventional or unconventional wars.
A very important aspect of counter-insurgency operations is the 'winning of hearts and minds' of the local populace and providing civic aid, which Indian Army has practiced for decades in Jammu & Kashmir, North East and in overseas UN peacekeeping operations.
Pre 9/11, India was often only scoffed at for this concept of 'winning of hearts and minds' and blamed for human rights violations by Western countries, whereas the US policy used to be that any collateral damage in the pursuit of its interest was acceptable. Afghanistan and Iraq proved - the hard way - the importance of this concept, the implementation of which is now being realised as crucial. This is what Lt Gen Richards implies.
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