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| Only permanent interests! | | |
Much has been said officially in New Delhi and Islamabad past one week about Chinese President, Hu Jintao, and his country's increasing role in South Asia. With the dramatic progress India and China have made in their relations it is established, beyond doubt, that there are no permanent friends and enemies. There are only permanent interests. President Hu Jintao's four-day visit to India, first by a Chinese head of state in 10 years, has resulted in significant expansion of trade and cooperation between the one-time enemies and current economic rivals.
The Asian giants agreed on a 10-point strategy that would take their relations to a new level. But it is their willingness to extend their cooperation to nuclear technology exchange that must have come as a surprise (shock?) to Pakistan, India's traditional rival and China's long-time ally, and United States. Interestingly, the US has already entered into a similar but far more important deal with Delhi. Clearly, China is keen to make up for the long period of hostility with India by taking extraordinarily bold strides on economic cooperation front. This despite the fact that Beijing continues to be a close friend and ally of Pakistan.
But reasons for China's keen interest in engaging India and vice versa are not far to find. Both India and China are two of the world's fastest growing economies today. This may result in some clash of interest. However, the neighbours cannot ignore each other's phenomenal economic potential. Which is why Hu Jintao regrets the fact that the level of trade between China and India is not representative of the size of the two most populous nations in the world. But trade is set to grow with the new warmth in relations. The neighbours have resolved to boost their trade to 40 billion dollars by 2010. It is not an impossible target to achieve.
The question is what all this bonhomie means for Pakistan. Islamabad would not certainly be comfortable with this growing camaraderie between its traditional ally and traditional rival. As President Hu Jintao began his three-day visit to Pakistan on November 23, this question did stare Islamabad in the face. Truth be told, lasting relationships are built and survive on lasting interests. If India and China are growing close, because it is in their interests. And if Pakistan and China must remain friends and allies, their relationship must be based on common interests. And common economic interests are certainly proving to be stronger and more enduring than geopolitical interests in the 21st century.
Pakistan would ignore these critical lessons at its own cost. If it does not want to be left out in the cold, it should strengthen itself economically and bolster its economic and trade ties with its friends and allies and the rest of the world. Hu Jintao's visit to India and Pakistan is rapidly becoming a test of that country's neutrality in South Asia as New Delhi and Islamabad look for the slightest tilt in the other's favour. At great pains to emphasise he is not against New Delhi's ties to Washington and willing to sign its own civilian nuclear agreement with Delhi, they have pledged to double trade and solve their boundary dispute.
Apart from Beijing's nuclear ties with Islamabad, the vexatious border issue-- on which Indian Prime Minister, Manmohan Singh, said that there would be no change involving uprooting of settled populations-- is where ties can flounder. All three lay claim to the same territory in the north-west that China and Pakistan are developing, aiming to link it with Gwadar on the Arabian Sea and thereby open a gateway to the Gulf's oil and gas reserves.
If Hu has to demonstrate that ties with India are not at the expense of Pakistan, and vice versa, he has a very tough balancing act ahead. India and China have agreed to cautiously move ahead with their military ties but the build up is likely to be a slow and gradual process rather than involving any dramatic advances. It is a question of mindsets--and more on the Indian side, conversations with senior officials involved in the strategic planning process revealed. While Beijing might want to push ahead rapidly, as has happened in the fields of nuclear energy cooperation and trade during the ongoing visit of Chinese President Hu Jintao, it would take a fair number of years before this happens in the military field.
In fact, even the joint statement issued on November 21 after talks between President Hu and Indian Prime Minister, Manmohan Singh, was rather guarded on the subject, given the major breakthrough that had been achieved on May 29 when then Indian Defence Minister, Pranab Mukherjee, and his Chinese counterpart Gen. Cao Gangchuan signed in Beijing a memorandum of understanding (MoU) that "provides a formal basis for the defence and military exchanges that have been taking place between the two countries in the last few years".
The joint statement said "the exchange of visits in the field of defence cooperation has resulted in building of mutual trust and enhancement of mutual understanding between the defence establishments of the two countries". "Both sides shall fully implement the provisions (of the May 29 MoU) which provides a sound foundation and institutional framework for further development of defence cooperation", the joint statement added. The document, however, was silent on an important element of the Beijing MoU: holding of joint military exercises. This aspect, an Indian Army officer pointed out, was the building block and indeed, the litmus test of bilateral military ties. As one officer put it: "Given the closeness of ties between China and Pakistan, we would be extremely wary of opening up our defence establishments to the Chinese or giving them an insight into our strategic thinking, particularly since we have an unresolved border dispute with them".
This is not to say that Indian and Chinese military officers have not been invited as observers to military exercises in each others' countries. This, however, is an entirely different ballgame as observers only get an overview of the action on the ground and not the larger picture-- that could involve giving out classified information. This is because, for the participants, exercises are much more than the name suggests. They test out doctrines, interoperability of personnel, armaments and equipment-- all for possible replication in real life situations in third countries. Thus, what it comes down to is a matter of trust-- or rather, the lack of it.
Then, there is the Siachen glacier, a 76-km wedge of ice that separates the Pakistani Army on the west and the People's Liberation Army to the east, and where India has grimly hung on to the heights it has occupied since 1984. The Indian and Pakistani armies were engaged in a two-decade-long bruising conflict at heights that rise to 22,000 feet till a truce was brokered in 2003. New Delhi is known to favour demilitarising the glacier as part of its efforts to improve ties with Islamabad but the Indian Army has made it clear that it will not be able to reoccupy its advantageous positions if it pulls out and Pakistan sends its forces in.
That is not all. The Indian Army also fears that were it to pull out, the Pakistani and Chinese forces could link up and pose a threat to the southern part of the strategically important Ladakh region of Jammu and Kashmir. |
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