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| When memory is selective | | Jaswant’s book leaves out many things | |
by K.K. Katyal
Narration of contemporary events and trends by a major player is not an easy task – he may be pilloried for what appear to be overstatements or understatements, may be questioned on points of fact, or may be seen as indulging in self-glorification. The former external affairs minister Jaswant Singh has undertaken this job, knowing full well the risks involved.
His latest book, A Call to Honour: In service of emergent India ( Rupa, New Delhi, 2006) is a marathon exercise, chronicling foreign policy-related developments during the six years of NDA rule. It is a readable narrative, the absence of new insights and the ponderous style notwithstanding. What he has penned is notable – equally so is what he has omitted.
His account of India’s dealings with Pakistan stops at the point when he moved to the finance ministry from external affairs. He could have extended it to cover subsequent developments, especially the making of the peace process, the cease-fire on the international border, the LOC and Siachen in November 2003, and the joint statement of Prime Minister Atal Behari Vajpayee and General Musharraf on January 6, 2004.
The book gives an account of the bus journey to Lahore in February 1999, starting with how the idea of this road travel was mooted at a luncheon meeting between Vajpayee and Nawaz Sharief in New York on September 23, 1998. Nawaz Sharief recalled his visit to India in 1982 to witness the Asian Games, having driven his own car to New Delhi, adding sentimentally, “Those were the days” to which Jaswant Singh interjected, “We can rediscover those days.” The process for the Delhi-Lahore bus service was then set in motion. Most of the details given in the book regarding Vajpayee’s journey on the inaugural run on February 20, 1999, are well-known. The euphoric scene at the Wagah-Attari border, the warm welcome, the talks between the two Prime Ministers, conclusion of three documents, the Lahore Declaration and the MOU between the two foreign secretaries.
We humble scribes had reported a lot more – like the absence of three service chiefs, including Gen Musharraf, then the chief of army staff, at the border (though they did salute Vajpayee at the governor’s residence), the tough stance of Pakistani officials during the preparatory discussions on the draft documents, who only gave up their inflexibility following Nawaz Sharief’s intervention at Brajesh Mishra’s instance.
On the humiliating episode of the hijacking of IC 814, Jaswant gives some graphic descriptions – for instance of Kandahar where the plane was eventually taken and where he went in a special aircraft, along with three TADA detenues to be handed over to secure the release of 166 passengers – but there is no addition to the known information.
He was exasperated that the hijacked plane was allowed to leave Amritsar but does not tell us why this avoidable lapse could not be averted. In his predictable defence of his trip to Kandahar, he cites some documents but leaves out those which, according to insiders, were not supportive of the controversial decision.
During his return flight from Kandahar, Jaswant Singh, we are told, spotted a young Frenchman who was crying incessantly, a Swiss gentleman of dignity and reserve, a lady from Nepal who thanked him profusely. Laudable human gesture, no doubt. But how come he does not spare a thought for the bride-turned-widow whose husband, Rupan Katyal, was brutally killed by the hijackers.
Kargil is the subject of self-congratulatory accounts – of the victory on the ground and in diplomatic moves. India, the book says, had achieved the substance of all that it had set out to, militarily and diplomatically. Not one inch was “negotiated away”, unlike the previous engagements, an obvious dig at the previous rulers. To Jaswant Singh, the US acknowledgement of Pakistan’s wrong-doing and recognition of the menace of terrorism was a “very significant gain.” His satisfaction over the then US president Bill Clinton’s tough talk with Nawaz Sharief is justified, but the book could have given some details of these encounters, of the type carried by the US papers.
As in the case of the Kandahar trip, Jaswant has done some defensive explaining regarding his role during the Agra summit. Was it “a draft” or “the draft” of the Vajpayee-Musharraf declaration which was okayed by Jaswant Singh? Was the approval of the two heads a mere formality? According to him, he merely corrected the “Punjabi English”, a remark taken sportingly by his counterpart Abdul Sattar. According to the other side, there was finality about the document but it fell through because of opposition from hawks like L.K. Advani, then home minister. The detailed narration in the book does give some overview of what went on in Agra but we are no wiser.
Jaswant Singh, as is known, has attached considerable significance to his talks with the US deputy secretary of state Strobe Talbot on the problems thrown up following India’s 1998 nuclear tests. That explains his disproportionately elaborate accounts of his many encounters with the US official. Going strictly by concrete results, there was nothing to write home about though Jaswant Singh claims considerable advance in the harmonization of their viewpoints and even sees the present India-US agreement as the culmination of that effort.
There are detailed accounts of other developments which are readable no doubt but do not present a complete picture. In defending mobilization of troops on the border after the terrorist attack on Parliament on December 13, 2001, he repeats the arguments given by the NDA government then. That it was part of coercive diplomacy, “combining aggressive diplomatic actions internationally with firm military positioning.” But we are also aware that there was controversy then over the merits of this move and over its achievement. Of this we do not get any indication in the book. It also glosses over the intense diplomatic activity which was witnessed then as top Western leaders had descended on New Delhi to plead for de-escalation.
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