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| Pakistan's Emotional Appeal | | | Atul Razdan | 6/11/2012 11:05:46 PM |
| Pakistan, which has persisted in its delusion of terming itself as a democracy, despite more than ample evidence of the overwhelming influence of its ubiquitous army in the body politic of the country, has never been short of inventiveness in its "diplomatic" overtures to India. This becomes most evident when the Pakistan military establishment ---- sorry, read Pakistan's 'democratic government' ---- fails in its preferred option of attempting to settle bilateral matters in its own favour through the use of arms. Instances of Pakistan's perfidy and its persistence vis a vis India, with selecting the use of military force and more recently terrorism, as a first option started in 1947 and are too well known to those familiar with sub continental history, to repeat here.
A persistent attempt made by Pakistan's has come over Siachen (the place of roses), a glacier located in Upper Kashmir, which has been a contentious issue for Pakistan since the area had not been clearly demarcated in the 1949 Cease Fire Line Agreement (CFL) signed between India, Pakistan and the UN Military Observer Group that demarcated the CFL. Upper Kashmir, beyond map reference NJ9842, was not demarcated as the area was snowbound and not thought fit for habitation. In 1963, Pakistan ceded the Shaksgam valley in Northern Kashmir to China in a border agreement and subsequently started to arbitrarily accord approval to western expeditions to the mountains of the area east of K-2, including to Siachen, Bilafond La and Saltoro Kangri in the region. Maps of the United Nations, other global agencies and even from Pakistan depicted the CFL correctly till approximately the early 70s'. The US Defence Mapping Agency (now known as the National Geospatial Intelligence Agency), in the second half of the 60s', then began blithely showing the international boundary in their Tactical Pilotage Charts as proceeding from point NJ 9842 east northeast to the Karakorum Pass (18,136 ft.) on the China border. This was done the US Agency upon a whim, without any justification or documentation whatsoever. As usual, the Americans felt they needed no logic to act on any matter that clearly did not concern them. Other international agencies and cartographers, following the herd principle, did likewise, without caring to establish facts for themselves. Meanwhile, following the publication of such faulty maps, international mountaineering expeditions applied to the Pakistan Government for expeditions to the area, which gave the latter a ready excuse to lay claim the entire 5,000 square mile area. Of course the United States never acknowledged or apologised for the mistake of their Agency and the US media, which is keen to comment patronisingly India-Pakistan matters, has also coolly ignored the issue.
A reference was made again to the area north of point NJ 9842 in the India Pakistan 1972 Simla Agreement, where it was mentioned that from this map reference, the boundary would run "north to the glaciers". The Indian Government and the military took notice of Pakistan's activity, protested the erroneous cartography and the Indian Army mounted an expedition to Teram Kangri II in 1978. At this stage, the army establishment in Rawalpindi decided to stake a physical claim to Siachen and started preparing a military operation to physically occupy the area. India, however, got to know of the Pakistani intentions, pre-empted 'Pindi and launched their own "Operation Meghdoot". In April 1984, the Kumaon Regiment occupied these heights, including the Saltoro ridge with the help of Indian Air Force (IAF) helicopters. The northern passes of Sia La, Bilafond La and Gyong La were also quickly occupied in this previously unmanned area. When the Pakistani army arrived in the area a week later, they found the Indian army controlling the strategic heights. Pakistan then made a series of attempts in 1984 and subsequently in 1987, 1990, 1995, 1996 and early 1999 to dislodge the Indian Army but failed. Former Pakistan President General Parvez Musharraf, states in his memoirs that in this operation India took control of almost 1,000 sq. Kms. of territory claimed (due to an error by American cartographers) by Pakistan. Incidentally, Siachen would rankle deep in General Musharraf's psyche; the fighting in the area included an unsuccessful operation in 1987, masterminded by him and attempted by a newly raised Special Services Group (SSG) commando unit, raised with the help of the United States Special Operations Forces, in the area. This was, of course, at the height of the US Pakistan love affair, before the relationship soured over Pakistan's collusion with Islamic fundamentalist elements and less-than-sincere attempts to confront terrorism.
In Siachen, Pakistan was totally stymied in its favourite tactic of forcibly occupying a position and then depending on the resultant international hullabaloo that would result from a fresh India Pakistan military confrontation, to help it maintain the advantage it has gained. Pakistan is, therefore, using diplomatic channels with India in an attempt to gain what it could not achieve militarily. Chief of Army Staff General Ashfaq Parvez Kayani, speaking in April 2012, after an avalanche hit the important Pakistani military base at Gayari near Siachen, in which 129 troops and 11 civilian contractors were killed, made an emotional appeal and called for the entire Siachen area being demilitarized, for a complete mutual withdrawal of troops of both sides and declaration of the region as non military. He also argued that both sides were spending an enormous amount of money on defending the area; money that could be better spent in development work. The same proposal was put forward earlier by former PM Nawaz Sharif and reiterated later by President Zardari. In a fit of what can only be described as petulance, Pakistan then had the temerity to insist that a withdrawal from Siachen was a 'central issue' and that further talks on existing bilateral issues like demarcation of Sir Creek could not be held until this 'central issue' was resolved. Truly, Pakistan seems to believe that the definition of its diplomacy is "lying in State". The appeal made by Pakistan is based entirely on self interest, keeping in mind the fact that the appeal being made is one of withdrawal of Indian troops from our own territory! In India's military establishment, the offer has been viewed with extreme scepticism. There is little sanity in our giving up a position of tactical and strategic superiority (the area enables us to monitor the Chinese-Pakistani shenanigans in the Karakorum Pass area) and stop an important infiltration route into India. Pakistan also speaks of the trust deficit between the two countries being reduced by India and the need for confidence building measures (CBMs) being initiated by India. It has also pleaded that since the area is part of Kashmir, which is a so called "disputed territory", India should withdraw from the area it has occupied. Islamabad conveniently forgets that Pakistan itself is guilty of not withdrawing from the portion of the state it has illegally occupied since 1947. Pakistan can demonstrate its willingness to reduce this trust deficit with India by abandoning its claim on Kashmir and withdrawing its forces from the portion of the state illegally occupied by it. The onus of reducing this 'trust deficit', as Pakistan fondly calls it, rests with Pakistan and not India.
Pakistan has a very poor record in building faith by its adherence to the letter of the law as far as India is concerned. Our Army has no intention of taking the Pakistan withdrawal offer seriously, as statements of senior Indian army men clearly show. Even on the political front, the issue is being approached with abundant caution, with India insisting on clear recognition of the existing AGPL before the matter of a military withdrawal is considered. India is rightly seeking iron clad guarantees that there will be no repetition of the scenario in Kargil (where unoccupied Indian positions were manned by the Northern Light Infantry (NLI), masquerading as 'mujahedeen'). Pakistan would not hesitate to draw in good friend China into defending the vacated area, if adequate guarantees are not enforced by India. Such measures would make it impossible for Pakistan to obfuscate bilateral issues and is, therefore, not acceptable to it. It is hoped the Indian political establishment has learnt its lesson and will not squander the advantage gained by the army through considerable effort and sacrifice. In the past our political masters have not exactly covered themselves in glory by tamely returning areas like the Haji Pir pass and the Ichhogil canal to Pakistan, after these were gained in war by the army, with much sacrifice. It is also hoped that our political hierarchy will stand firm and not be swayed into conceding on Siachen due to the emotional appeals of Pakistan's political and military hierarchy. If news reports are taken into consideration, many analysts are of the opinion that such an eventuality is not yet beyond our politicians. Mercifully for the time being, Defence Minister A.K.Antony in a recent statement has indicated that the Indian Government will approach the issue in forthcoming talks with Pakistan with caution and that no breakthroughs can be expected in the forthcoming talks.- WordSword Features.
The write, a retired officer of the Research and Analysis Wing, is a former journalist, who worked for the Hindustan Times. The views expressed in the article are his own.
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