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| Background Challenges of Indo-US Political Relations | | | Dr. Rajkumar Singh
At the close of the century India’s understanding with the US touched a new height which demoted India to the status of a camp follower. The US foreign Policy under George William Bush was felt by the world with difference. Bill Clinton’s vision of a brave new world is being supplanted by Bush’s dangerous new world. His belief was that with the cold war over, the world could get together and agree not to do certain nasty things – test or build nuclear weapons, block trade and investment. Clinton’s liberal world view was left behind by George Bush who announced on January 29, 2002, “I will not wait events while dangers gather. I will not stand by as peril draws closer and closer. The US will not permit the world’s most dangerous regimes to threaten us with the world’s most destructive weapons. Although the statement was made in the background of terrorist attack on World Trade Center in September 2001, we can not overlook US plan of implementing National Missile Defence (NMD) and Threat Missile Defence (TMD) which is bound to add to India’s problems. If NMD is seen to work, the United States could extend a “Missile Umbrella” to its allies the way it presently holds out a nuclear umbrella. The US Ballistic Missile Defence Organisation is of the view that such a globally – expansive missile defence system would help safeguard unipolarity, providing the impetus to other nations to enhance their military arrangements with the US.
Initial Indian diplomacy
At independence the policy of Non-alignment was adopted as a tool of political diplomacy in international politics which meant, from the very beginning, to keep away from bipolarity, the cold war, ideological crusades, the arms race and military blocs which were the chief characteristics of the era following the second world war. The unique configuration of world Politics after the second world war admirably suited the establishment of India’s non-alignment and gave it greater significance than it would have had in other circumstances. The balance of power diplomacy of the pre-war years disappeared and the entire developed world was divided into two opposing nuclear-armed blocs, each with an integrated politico-military structure. As a result of the cold war the Third World countries, which were gaining independence became a surrogate area for superpower competition. The Soviet Union, though a nuclear armed, was essentially a territorial power at that stage.
India generally perceived herself as a major actor to play an international role. Unlike domestic politics, playing a role in international system broadly refers to the wish and capacity of a nation to push the movement of international events in a given direction or to influence the behaviour of other states, or to manage a crisis through a series of mediatory initiatives, or even to project herself as a model for others to emulate. A visible or impactful role in the international system can be of two types. The first pertains to the utilisation of force or pressure through which a nation can modify a given situation or through which it can change the behaviour of a nation or a group of playing pertains to the utilisation of respect, confidence and the moral authority that the state may have as nations. However, material capacity and the appropriate political determination to do so is the obvious precondition for the successful achievement of such an objective. The second type of role acquired to peacefully wield influence on nations or situations. At the time of independence, India did not have the necessary military power to forcefully play a regional or global role. But on the otherhand, there appeared a fairly large consensus that India had some moral authority in terms of philosophy and religion.
Indian diplomacy in practice
It was this policy of non-alignment which became the most characteristic and abiding feature of India’s foreign policy. However, until 1950 India’s non-alignment appeared to have a pro-Western orientation. From 1951 to 1956 it moved from a Western oriented non-alignment towards a more strictly middle of the road position. During this period India’s relations with both the Soviet Union and with China improved, with the US deteriorated and those with Britain showed some considerable fluctuations. India’s consistent disapproval of all Western alliances helped India improve its relations with the Communist powers and by the end of 1956 India’s policy had inclined in favour of the Soviet bloc. But things did not work smoothly any more and the closing years of Nehru era witnessed a slow erosion of his policy’s framework. Factors responsible for this decline include border disputes with China, a humiliating defeat in October 1962 and evolution of a global situation in which there was no scope for mediation to manage international crisis.
In the post-Nehru era, India’s role playing deteriorated under his successors, never to rise again. The positive and dynamic aspects of non alignment, expressive of a desire for active participation in the grand affairs of world politics, gave way to more humble preoccupation with saving India from predatory neighbours and staying out of other nation’s complicated affairs. Many Indians expressed their convictions that it would be more important for India to take care of immediate national interests than of the world’s moral welfare. The principal thrust of India’s foreign policy was thus more power and region oriented than one of seeking out a new global role for itself. However, Indira Gandhi after her second mandate in 1980, sought out a role in world politics when India had attained the status of a regional power and was internationally recognised as such. But her initiatives and declarations did not lead to the establishment of a real framework as she abruptly disappeared from the political scene of the country.
Emerging changes in Indo-US diplomacy
The changes which were visualised in world order at the close of the eighties began to take a concrete shape in the opening years of the coming decade. The main components of the structural change that has already been affected relate to the revolution of 1989 in Eastern Europe, the reunification of Germany, the collapse of the Warsaw pact, the structuring of NATO, the historic signing of the 1987 International Nuclear Forces Treaty, the outgoing US – Russian talks for further strategic arms reduction, the end of cold war and above all, the Soviet State’s changing role in world affairs. With the end of the cold war, the US and the Russian States no longer appeared in confrontationist roles in South Asia. This had relevance for both the 1959 bilateral treaty of alliance between the US and Pakistan, and the Indo-Soviet Treaty of 1971.
The ever – changing international milieu and internal situation of the country are going to pose major challenges to both foreign policy making and diplomatic practice. The old domestic consensus on country’s foreign policy framework has crumbled. There are now substantial differences of view on how the US, China and Pakistan should be handled. So are there on the positions to be taken at the various international fora dealing with economic political and security issues. Secondly, the mode of engagement with the external environment has changed. Even at the government to government level, India would have to negotiate much more multilaterally than before. In today’s complex world marked by fluidity and uncertainty, India needs to cultivate close relations not only with just one or two powers but with several. Promotion of various interests requires a multiplicity of engagement and different formations of partnership. |
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