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| DB sets-aside writ Court judgment, draws distinction between donation, acquisition | | | Early Times Report
JAMMU, Sept 13: A Division Bench of Jammu & Kashmir and Ladakh High Court comprising Justice Sanjeev Kumar and Justice Rahul Bharti, allowed the appeal filed by Govt and set-aside the judgment of writ Court and draws a distinction between Donation and Acquisition.
Division Bench while setting-aside the judgment of writ court, whereby Writ Court allowed the writ petition, directed to offer employment to the writ petitioner within a period of eight weeks from the date of impugned judgment in terms of SRO 181 of 1988, after hearing AAG Amit Gupta observed that SRO 181 of 1988 was not applicable to the donation of land made voluntarily by the citizens and two that SRO 181 of 1988 was prospective in operation, we cannot accede to the contention of the writ petitioner that right to employment had accrued to him with the promulgation of SRO 181 of 1988. That apart, it is not the case of the writ petitioner that he had acquired eligibility to seek employment or that he had staked his claim for such employment at any time between issuance of SRO 181 of 1988 and issuance of SRO 214 of 1991.
DB further observed that this Court cannot also miss to notice that vide SRO 214 of 1991 the notification issued vide SRO 181 of 1988 was rescinded with a clear stipulation that no such appointments shall be made in cases which were under process at the time of issuance of the notification.
DB further observed that though, in the instant case, the case of the writ petitioner was not even pending consideration as the petitioner had not even acquired the eligibility to seek employment and might have been minor at the relevant point of time, yet, we find that even if his case was pending and was still under process, the same was not to be considered in view of the provisions of SRO 214 of 1991. It needs to be noted that SRO 214 of 1991, or for that matter, SRO 181 of 1988 were not the subject matter of challenge in the writ petition.
n view of the aforesaid discussion, Division Bench refrain from going into the contention of counsel for the appellants that father of the petitioner was not even holding title to the property donated by him to the Department of Health for construction of PHC. We also need not go into the other aspects highlighted by leaned counsel for the appellants that father of the petitioner had sufficient agricultural land which he had sold to one Yousaf and, therefore, it was not even a case where the father of the writ petitioner was left with 50% or less of agricultural land after donating 1 kanal for construction of PHC.
With these observations Division Bench find enough merit in the appeal preferred by the appellants/State. The appeal is, accordingly, allowed and the impugned order of the Writ Court is set aside. As a result, the writ petition of the writ petitioner shall stand dismissed.
—JNF |
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