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| Regional conflict and arms race in South Asia | | |
Dr. Rajkumar Singh
The major ups and downs took place in Indo-Pak defence relations and perceptions since the Government of Bharatiya Janata Party and its allies assumed power in India, on 19 March 1998. Tension between the two was charged in general but particularly on nuclear matters. Although Islamabad had been increasing its defence expenditures disproportionately for the last several years, in a fresh initiative, it decided to procure state-of-art fighter planes from Russia, Sweden and France to bridge a gap with India in the field of conventional arms. On 6 April 1998 Pakistan successfully test-fired its Intermediate Range Ballistic Missile (IRBM), Ghauri, capable of carrying nuclear warheads that, as claimed by the Pakistani scientists can target most major cities in India. New Delhi termed the development as a “setback” in Indo-Pak relations and a spokesman of the External Affairs Ministry said, “We will draw appropriate conclusions from the development and take resolute steps to meet any threat to India’s security. After the test-firing there was a general feeling in India that New Delhi should now wake up to the fact that it cannot afford to back-pedal on its integrated guided missile development programme. The development was also a setback for US efforts for reducing tension in the sub-continent and persuading India and Pakistan to take a softer view on NPT and CTBT.
Wide reactions of explosions
Less in response and more for its defence sake, India, on 11 and 13 May 1998, exploded its five nuclear devices at Pokhran (Rajasthan).In retaliation Islamabad exploded its six nuclear devices at the end of that month. The development was an ominous signal for Indo-Pak relations and a chain of allegations and counterallegations started between the two countries. Nuclear blasts by India and Pakistan had surprised the world, particularly nuclear powers of the world. The United States along with others imposed economic and defence-related sanctions on New Delhi and Islamabad. Even earlier, in March 1998, Britain had threatened to cut off aid to Pakistan unless it reduces its defence expenditure. Considering the expenditure as “disproportionate” Claire Short, British Minister for International Development, assured House of Commons, during question hour that Britain would try to persuade to cut its defence expense. Peking, despite being an important supplier of defence equipments to Pakistan was also shocked over India and Pakistan’s nuclear-charged tension. Japan too, in its annual report maintained that the explosions had threatened security balance in Asia and had affected not only the security of South Asia, but also efforts towards the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.
Managing efforts by India and Pakistan
New Delhi, in its efforts to restore some normalcy in relation to Pakistan after the nuclear explosion it had offered a no-first-use agreement to Islamabad which had been rejected by the latter. Following the rejection, in a spirit of accommodation and rational compromise, India had discussed measures to bring about strategic restraint in terms of nuclear weapons and missiles with Pakistan. Particularly in nuclear field, New Delhi has expressed itself emphatically and Prime Minister Vajpayee has broadly defined India’s nuclear doctrine since the day he assumed office. He did this in Parliament, at the non-aligned summit in Durban and at the UN General Assembly in NewYork. However, India is coming to grips with the dilemmas emanating from the country’s nuclear weaponisation and is in the process of forging a cohesive policy responsive to the multi-dimensional requirement of India’s nuclear weapon status. India still has to cope with obstacles and challenges. Nawaz Sharif, in course of his visit to the United States of America met President Clinton on 2 December 1998. The President made it clear that Pakistan had to take additional concrete steps to address America’s non-proliferation and security concerns before Washington could even consider being more helpful. The sanctions imposed after the nuclear explosion had not only hurt the Pakistani economy, but also impaired its conventional capabilities. In the circumstances, Islamabad wanted the US to be kinder but Assistant Secretary for South Asia Karl Inderfurth had brutally briefed, “We cannot help him unless he helps himself. For us to have any opportunity to address the conventional military needs of Pakistan, it will have to take further steps to address our concerns on non-proliferation". Pakistan's Premier hoped during the visit to discover a satisfactory solution to the long standing dispute over the F-16 aircraft, paid for by Islamabad, but not delivered because of Pressler Amendment restrictions. The US Administration also disappointed Nawaz Sharif on the issue of American mediation in the Kashmir dispute and he had received his most serious rebuff. Despite disappointments on defence count, as a new years’ gift, in January 1999 Pakistan received from the US administration 464 million, most of its in cash, as reimbursement for the 28 F-16 combat jets, purchased a decade ago but never received.
Revival of arms race in the region
The two Prime Ministers at their meeting at NewYork in September 1998 agreed to start a bus service from New Delhi to Lahore that followed an agreement between the two in December. Vajpayee made a visit to Pakistan by the first bus and entered in Pakistan’s territory through Wagah border in Punjab. This much publicised bus diplomacy and Lahore declaration, issued at the end of the visit on 21 February 1999,marked a new era of understanding and amicable relations between the two countries. However, there was no compromise from both sides, on defence-related matters and they continued to prepare, as earlier, their nuclear armaments and test-firing of missiles. Despite very hopeful end of Vajpayee’s visit to Pakistan, its President and Prime Minister hinted/reminded Indian Prime Minister of the problem of Kashmir. Later in April 1999, Sartaj Aziz, the Foreign Minister of Pakistan, while addressing the United Nations Commission on Human Rights, at Geneva, was quoted as saying that complete and durable normalisation can become a political reality once a just and peaceful solution has been found to the core dispute over Kashmir.
As expected by Islamabad and as a follow up of the Lahore declaration Pakistan was informed a bit earlier (on 9 April) and India successfully test-fired the extended range Agni-II intermediate range ballistic missile on 11 April 1999, in a bid to bridge a key gap in its nuclear deterrent profile.Islamabad, apart from criticizing the test-firing of Agni-II promised a tit-for-tat and Sartaj Aziz said, “Since India has gone ahead, we would probably have to respond fittingly. We will decide in a day or two”. In retaliation Pakistan successfully test-fired its Ghauri-II missile on 14 April 1999 followed by the test-firing of Shaheen missile next day (15 April). It is a surface –to-surface missile having a range of 600 km with capacity of carrying nuclear warhead. The test-firing of Agni-II missile by India and Ghauri-II and Shaheen by Pakistan received world-wide condemnation. White House spokesman Joe Lockhart said that “Although these may not violate any existing arms control treaty; they certainly do nothing to enhance the environment in which co-operation between the countries is enhanced”. Beijing too called on India and Pakistan to take steps to prevent an arms race and suggested that both sides should seek concrete avenues to avoid the acceleration of an arms race in South Asia so that peace and stability could prevail. |
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