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| National turmoil and nuclear power in perspective | | | Dr. Rajkumar Singh
In fact, the spread of nuclear weapons is a dynamic process in which the interests of several states interact and the likelihood of proliferation is largely determined by the strategic interaction between a state deciding whether to acquire nuclear weapons and its adversaries. This interaction is shaped by the potential proliferators ability to defer a preventive strike on its nuclear programme prior to acquiring the bomb. Although scattered mention on domestic factors is found in literature on (non-) proliferation dynamic, focusing on domestic political factors as drivers for decisions to acquire or forgo nuclear weapons is relatively a new branch on nuclear-related research. The domestic political context has several dimensions such as, domestic turmoil, regime pessimism, the type of regime, the importance of the psychological profile of state leaders, influence of elite groups and civilian nuclear power bureaucracies. It is all included under the umbrella of political domestic context and all dimensions within this factor are based on national political circumstances and dynamics that influence the decision to pursue or forgo nuclear weapons.
Role of domestic turmoil
In domestic political context domestic turmoil is perceived as threatening the power of the state leadership. States facing domestic tensions may use a nuclear weapon programme and the international condemning reactions on it as a method of diversion.
Nuclear weapons programmes may respond to, or even bolster, nationalist sentiments and international negative reactions may cause a "rallying around the flag" effect, ending domestic dissensions for some time. By diverting public attention from unfavorable domestic issues, the regime could strengthen its position. Related to the domestic turmoil aspect, as considered by Kurt Campbell, regime pessimism works as a factor of potential influence on nuclear weapons proliferation. According to him especially ‘‘States in decline" tend to consider developing nuclear weapons because often they suffer from a kind of societal insecurity over future economic and security pitfalls. In that kind of situation, the regime pessimism of states may use a nuclear weapons programme to prevent the state sinking into oblivion or being overshadowed by rival states. In recent literatures, too, these factors are being emphasized.
Regime type is important
In another grouped factor in this category is the regime type of countries.
In International Relations there exists a number of studies suggesting that democracies are less likely to engage in armed conflict against each other compared to autocracies. It is generally believed that abiding by international law and its established norms is normal behaviour in the international society of states. But in comparison totalitarian states with a power-seeking or paranoid leadership are more likely to breach their obligations openly or clandestinely.
However, on the other hand some authors also maintained that democracies tend to be slightly more inclined to pursue nuclear weapons, because democratic leadership may be more vulnerable to use a nuclear weapons programme to boost their popularity among nationalist population, because they wish to be re-elected-something about which a dictator does not need to worry. In the context in a relatively early study conducted by Richard Betts, he especially focused on states with an isolated position in the international community which generally are authoritarian states. Another pioneering research after a long gap (2007) also focused on the political-ideological orientation of state leadership regarding the economic integration of their state in the international system. When a state leadership is aiming for economic growth and prosperity by international trade, it will have much to lose if it decides to acquire nuclear weapons. On the other if the state leaders are not interested in the economic integration of their country in the international system will have less to lose by acquiring nuclear weapons. In his study Solingen concluded that nuclear programmes are less likely to emerge in countries where the political culture is in general sympathetic to economic openness, trade liberalization, foreign investments, and international economic integration. At large, in the cluster of domestic political context two different groups of domestic actors are seen as influential: political leaders themselves as well as societal group having the ability to somehow influence the political leadership.
Psychological factors
In a further and recent study Jacques Hymans, has focused on the importance of the psychological profile of state leaders on decisions to acquire or forgo nuclear weapons.
In the context he argued that especially state leader's conceptions of the national identity are the most influential factor regarding these decisions.
Hymans developed four categories of state leader's profiles: oppositional nationalist, oppositional subalterns, sportsmanlike nationalists, and sportsmanlike subalterns and concluded that state leaders with the psychological profile of the oppositional nationalist-characterized by a mixture of fear and pride-are most likely to decide to acquire nuclear weapons. In line the "domestic elite theory" was first provided by Peter Pringle and James Spigelman in 1981 and later by Peter Lavoy who clearly links the domestic elite factor to the security issue and describes the process of domestic elites influencing nuclear weapons decision making as "nuclear mythmaking. Once a state has started civilian nuclear programme, the role of civilian nuclear power bureaucrats naturally become important as well as relevant.
conclude, the set of factors may provide insight to anyone who got lost in the academic debate on nuclear (non-) proliferation motivation, and could especially be helpful to analysts and policy makers who deal with potential current or future proliferating states.
In larger as well as specific cases, states' nuclear weapons programmes are not a static process.
These national policies are part of a constantly evolving situation, and international policies aimed at influencing such issues should match this dynamism as well.
They need to be sufficiently fluid to cover the starts, stops, setbacks and shifts that comprise any state's nuclear weapons (non-) acquisition policy. Intuitively, security is the most important driving nuclear acquisition, but it is not in a position to explain why others are not.
This lack of consensus on the causes of nuclear acquisition and forbearance has serious consequences for global non-proliferation policy, and decision makers are limited in their ability to identify the policies most likely to deter other states from acquiring the bomb. |
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