Hyder Ali
Early Times Report
srinagar, Feb 25: With situation turning normal after the deadly Pampore encounter that costed Army the lives of its two young officers, besides men, introspections have begun to assess the response of the Army and security forces involved in the encounter.
The encounter, considered deadliest in the past over a decade of Fidayeen attacks, stretched to three days and took lives of five security force personnel including two Army captains.
Security analysts look at it as the "intelligence failure" even as the eyebrows are being raised over alleged lack of coordination between police, Army and the CRPF in execution of the operation.
About the "intelligence failure", the security analysts said the forces didn't "size up the militants properly." "The inputs about the strength and skills of the militants proved absolutely wrong as the trio was heavily armed and highly trained. This means the plan to make Para Commandos silently storm the building at midnight was incorrect," the analysts said.
This miscalculation, however, claimed a precious life for the Army officer. On the intervening night of February 20 and 21, the team of Para Commandos led by Captain Pawan Kumar, a 23-year-old officer stormed the main building at around 2:00 AM.
Sources said the militants were alert and the moment the commandoes sneaked into the building, they retaliated with heavy gunfire and critically injured Captain Kumar who was rushed to Army hospital where he succumbed.
The next morning, the Army made another attempt to storm the upper floor of the main building, where the militants were hiding. This time Captain Tushar Mahajan, 26, a resident of Jammu's Udhampur, was leading the daredevil team. Bullets peppered on him too. This brave commando was also killed.
Finally, after two fatal casualities, on the third day, the security forces started "introspection" when the General Officer Commanding of the Srinagar-based Chinar Corps, Lt Gen Satish Dua, told reporters, "There is no time limit. There is no hurry."
While requisite intelligence inputs to storm the building were missing, "lack of coordination" is another concern, which is being discussed in various forums. Sources said the police was kept at a distance.
Official sources said the Special Operations Group of the Jammu and Kashmir Police was not directly involved in the operation. Though initially CRPF cordoned the EDI campus after attack on its convoy, within an hour Army took over.
They said till now the precedence had been that the State police would actively participate in the encounters. "But this time the police was mostly into the job of ensuring cordon, that too the outer one," said an analyst in know of the developments.
He said had the three forces acted in a coordinated way, the encounter could have ended much early and with minimal loss of precious lives.
The Army admits that the gravity of the encounter has led to introspection as the encounter "offered some important lessons".
Though Army says it was introspecting if the casualities could be avoided, it denies the allegations of having superseded other forces in the operation which stretched to three days.
A senior Army official told Early Times that the complexity of the attack was such that it took time.
"Lack of coordination is incorrect… This kind of operation required synergy but it was a complex situation, a big campus, many buildings and dozens of rooms. It was to be room to room clearance," the official told Early Times.
On February 20, after opening fire on a CRPF convoy on the Srinagar-Jammu highway, the militants had sneaked into the nearby EDI complex, a concrete five storey structure.
The militants asked the employees at the building to leave the office even as they themselves took positions at advantageous heights. The employees were, however, asked to leave behind their belongings particularly mobile phones.
As already reported by Early Times the security analysts apprehend that the militants had already done recce of the building and dumped ammunition there ahead of the deadly encounter. |
