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| Changing contours of Pakistan's nuclear thinking | | | Dr.Rajkumar Singh | 12/21/2019 11:06:01 PM |
| Originally, the Pakistani government's nuclear policy and activities hinged on two fundamental premises. First, despite its apprehension over New Delhi's nuclear motivations, Islamabad believed that India would not be able to develop nuclear weapons. This presumption was shaped by the assumption that making a nuclear bomb needed a technological knowledge that India clearly lacked in the 1950s and at least in the first half of the 1960s. However, this perception gradually modified in the second half of the 1960 in accordance with nuclear developments in India. Second, Pakistani political leaders discounted their own technological know-how to make nuclear weapons. Islamabad certainly took note of nuclear developments in India, but its own underdeveloped nuclear infrastructure did not provide any scope to consider a deviation from its own ongoing course of peaceful nuclear development.
First external exposure
In this phase of Pakistan's nuclear development there were several factors that had a significant bearing on the changing contour of country's nuclear thinking. First, in 1960, the American spy plane U2 was shot down by the Soviet Union took off from the Pakistani city of Peshawar. In the midst of the incident, Soviet Leader Nikita Khrushchev declared that he had marked a red ring around Peshawar on his map . Islamabad took this statement as a threat to Pakistan's security and supposed that Soviet nuclear weapons were now targeted towards Pakistan. Secondly, it confronted nuclear threat in 1965. During the 1965 Indo-Pak war, it was surmised that China might join the war in favour of latter. In course of the war in November 1965 the British High Commissioner in Pakistan warned Ayub Khan of "dire consequences" if Chinese involvement in the war materialised. He said that if the Chinese joined the war, the game then would be played by others including nuclear powers and might enlarge the conflict in such a way that there will be no Kashmir to fight for, nor Pakistan. Islamabad also took this incident as it could pose nuclear threats if it suited United Kingdom's strategic purposes.
Factors related to India
In the context next to none is the fact that Pakistan's nuclear programme is primarily influenced by the nuclear activities of India. But the whole nuclear perspective of the region abruptly changed when in 1964 China exploded its nuclear device. It followed a hot discussions on nuclear weapon programme in India that further accentuated Pakistani perception. The Indian reaction to the Chinese nuclear test and the debate it triggered in India were followed closely by Islamabad. Particularly Indian chief nuclear scientist Homi J. Bhabha's assertion that India could detonate a nuclear device in eighteen months sparked enormous concern in Pakistan. The Pakistani political and military circles concluded that the acquisition of nuclear weapons by India would aggravate Pakistan's own security predicament. In addition, India's commissioning of a plutonium reprocessing plant in 1965 was another event that accentuated Islamabad's apprehension about its neighbour's nuclear motivation.
On nuclear issue Islamabad was following New Delhi closely and Pakistan's decision not to sign the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) in 1968 was also influenced by Indian decision. In a earlier development on the discriminatory aspects of NPT India refused to sign and had decided to sustain its independence on international security by allowing her for the development of the peaceful nuclear explosion technology. In response to Indian decision Pakistan, although was positive and played a constructive role during the whole period of NPT negotiations (1965-1968), it finally failed to sign the treaty. Pakistan's decision not to sign was significant for two principal reasons. First, it was a clear manifestation of Islamabad's growing concern over India's nuclear potential, which ushered in a new era of India-oriented nuclear policy. Second, it confirmed that Pakistan would retain the option to develop nuclear weapons.
Domestic conditions
Gradually, the nuclear weapons programme became a domestic issue and especially following Bhutto's resignation from the Ayub cabinet after the 1965 Indo-Pakistan War, situations changed in favour of Bhutto as well as nuclear weapons programme and in the 1970 general election nuclear issue was at the forefront of election campaign. While in opposition Bhutto primarily emphasised two rationales for a Pakistani nuclear deterrent force. First, India's nuclear programme was motivated to build nuclear weapons. Possession of nuclear weapons by India would add a new dimension to Pakistan's already serious security dilemma. Second, Pakistan needed a nuclear deterrent force to offset India's superiority in conventional military power. Bhutto's conviction led him to conclude, "If India developed an atomic bomb, we too will develop one even if we have to eat grass or leaves or to remain hungry because there is no conventional alternative to the atomic bomb". For the first time in Pakistani politics foreign and defense policies were raised and Bhutto's Pakistan Peoples Party (PPP) highlighted the nuclear issue and assured the public that if voted to power, his party would develop a "full-fledged" military nuclear programme. However, despite this subtle shift in Pakistan's nuclear weapons perception, there is no evidence that during the period from 1954-1971 any government in Pakistan embarked on a military nuclear programme. Even after the adoption of a "nuclear option" policy that was manifested in the 1968 NPT decision, Islamabad remained focused on peaceful nuclear activities.
Developments after 1971
After the India-Pakistan War of 1971, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto assumed power in Pakistan on 20 December 1971. In its changed perception Islamabad regards nuclear weapons and their delivery systems as essential to offsetting its conventional inferiority against India and maintaining the South Asian balance of power. The technological achievement associated with nuclear weapons and ballistic and cruise missiles is closely tied to Pakistan's post-colonial identity as the first Muslim country to have acquired such capabilities. With these objectives in view, under Bhutto, Pakistan now embarked on the scheme and as a first step in the direction of institution of a nuclear weapons programme Bhutto tasked Munir Ahmad Khan, currently on a stint at the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), Vienna, to prepare a report on Pakistan's nuclear infrastructure. Just after assumption of power in Pakistan on 20 January 1972 Bhutto held an extensive meeting with senior Pakistani nuclear scientists to discuss the possibility of embarking on a nuclear weapons programme. The meeting was held at the residence of the Punjab Chief Minister Nawab Sadiq Qureshi in Multan where key invitees include scientists from the Pakistan Institute for Nuclear Science & Technology, the Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission, Quaid-e-Azam University, Islamabad, Government College, Lahore, and the Defence Science & Technology Organization (DESTO). During the meeting, several scientists enthusiastically supported the idea of a nuclear weapons programme. In the meeting Bhutto endorsed the idea and promised that his government will spare no facilities and finances" for a weapon programme. He demanded that the scientists produce a fission device within three years and also announced that Munir Ahmad Khan will replace Dr. Usmani as Chairman of the PAEC. In fact, the meeting was the starting point of Pakistan's nuclear weapons programme for military purposes and Bhutto was the main architect of this programme. |
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