| The good, the bad and the ugly | | | Pravin Sawhney | 11/21/2013 10:52:47 PM |
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In the midst of controversial developments in the Indian Army stood Gen VK Singh, the epitome of rectitude, determined to cleanse the cancerous system. His book, Courage and Conviction, should do good business, not least for its salacious content General VK Singh's 14 month tenure as the Chief of Army Staff was tumultuous with the media feverishly keeping pace with the unfolding events. Stories of incompetence, unpreparedness for war, corruption, and conspiring leadership in the Army were constantly jostling for space with omnipresent arms dealers and their nexus with civilian and Army bureaucracy and defence public sector units. From the COAS' office right up to the Prime Minister's Office, the malaise seemed unmistakeable. At the centre of it all stood Gen Singh, the epitome of rectitude determined to cleanse the cancerous system. Little wonder that the accomplished publisher, David Davidar, persuaded the General to write his recently released autobiography titled, Courage and Conviction, which is sure to do good business for its salacious contents. On a serious note, three issues - Army's leadership, preparedness for war, and defence procurements - dealt by the writer, deserve attention. It was probably the rebel in him that wrote what none of his predecessors had done before.
On leadership, to quote the writer, "We are fooling ourselves if we thought that the rank and file was unaware of what was happening. Moreover, everything we did, or didn't do, reflected on the institution." So, here was Gen Singh who was born in 1951, but had himself signed that he was born instead in 1950, as otherwise he would not have become an Army commander and thence the four-star COAS. Sure, it was the 'system's' fault to have tinkered with his year of birth. Yet, the General's moment of truth to stand up was when he was asked to sign on the 1950 date of birth. But, he decided to wait to become the COAS. Only a self-obsessed officer would have pitted the Army (as its COAS) against the Government, and thereafter, drag it to the Supreme Court for personal redress. The first 300 pages of his book show him suffering from the 'I, Me, Myself' syndrome that he saw in others. At every stage in his (otherwise enviable) career he reached out to the Military Secretary's branch at the Army Headquarters with help from his Rajput regiment senior officers for good postings, something only the ambitious lot, who place themselves before their command, do. The other leadership failing, as pointed out by the writer, is "the zero error syndrome that has gripped our command structure today." Thus, the diminishing mutual respect between officers and the rank and file is at the heart of what ails the 13 lakh- strong Army today.
The leadership crisis led to defunct war preparedness, and the writer has been candid on this issue. The writer was responsible for the training and the operations of 11 Corps in Jalandhar during the 10-month Operation Parakram in 2001-2002, when Indian and Pakistani Armies stood face-to-face, ready for war. He writes that, "The very first few days of Operation Parakram exposed the hollowness of our operational preparedness." He further writes that, "A large number of mines had fuses that wouldn't fit, and in true Indian Army style, the men would try and force the fuze in. Mine after mine exploded, killing men in numbers (over 500) that were shockingly high. Helplessly, the Army kept sitting on the border, its men and equipment both victims of attrition." The situation in Jammu & Kashmir, which has nearly 40 per cent of the Army under the Northern Command, was equally pathetic. According to the writer, "Northern Command further compounded the problem by declaring that it needed time for the troops -who are mostly deployed in a counter-insurgency role - to re-orient themselves (for conventional war)."
Yet, as COAS, Gen Singh and his ilk vociferously defended the need for the Army to continue with counter-insurgency operations in the border State. Once the alarming situation during Operation Parakram (where the Army lacked equipment, training and orientation for war) is juxtaposed with the writer's letter written to the Prime Minister, as the COAS a decade later in April 2011 (which got leaked), that the Army was unfit for war, the inescapable conclusion stares in the face. Officers have a vested interest in continuing with counter-insurgency operations in Jammu & Kashmir as it brings laurels, rewards and status. Preparedness for conventional war gives them no such goodies. This is not all. Gen Singh admits that the controversial Armed Forces Special Powers Act, which is essential for counter-insurgency operations, has been misused by senior officers. He writes that, "How else do we justify officers at the level of corps and Army commanders using AFSPA as a protective shield from behind which their chosen few can operate at liberty?" His finger clearly points towards Lieutenant General Dalbir Suhag, whose promotion for Army Commander was held up on grounds of protecting an erring officer under AFSPA. Lt Gen Suhag is the senior-most to succeed the COAS, General Bikram Singh. On procurements, the book is an eye-opener. According to the writer, each year unspent money of a service which has been allocated for its capital or equipment acquisitions during a financial year is re-appropriated. Instead of being available for the services' procurement during the following financial year, the hefty amount finds its way into the ruling political party's coffers. The writer dwells at length on the nexus between the arms dealers, civil and military bureaucrats and PSUs. The well-known case of Tatra vehicles where Gen Singh was purportedly offered `14 crore by a retired Army General to sign the deal for 700 over-priced vehicles has been elaborated upon. The writer gives details about other pertinent issues that he handled (unsuccessfully) during his term in office. These include the 'Transformational Study' to re-orient the Army from a threat-based to a capability-based force; the need to overcome shortage of young officers; to abolish the Sahayak system where soldiers are used by officers for household tasks; to the incompetence of the Ordnance Factory Board, which sat over the Bofors gun's technology transfer documents procured at a huge price in 1986. Certainly an upright officer, he failed to realise when it was time to get off the train and move on. This harmed the institution that he worked for all his life. However, by writing this autobiography, he seems to have salvaged some ground. His book is candid and needs to be read by the next Government to understand what ails the Indian Army.
( The writer is editor of FORCE, a news magazine on national security) ( Courtesy The Pioneer) |
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