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| Delinking Talks with terror leads nowhere | | |
Ashok K Mehta
The recent flare-up along
the LoC shows that
Pakistan still considers India to be its foremost enemy. In this regard, New Delhi's efforts to insulate Islamabad from the 'deep state' are futile.
The ceasefire on the Line of Control which has generally been observed since November 2003 was seriously breached last month, triggered by Pakistani regulars ambushing an Indian patrol in the Poonch sector. The action-reaction exchange of fire constitutes a record-breaking 30 plus ceasefire violations in August alone. Altogether, so far this year, there have been nearly 100 violations, which is a 90 per cent hike compared to last year in the same period. This focussed firing and retaliation is a first in 10 years on the LoC and its Pakistani purpose has to be decoded.
The Indian response is being described as calibrated, clinical and calculated which translates into measured punishment but with restraint. The Indian Army can give back with interest, what it gets. That the response has been effective and even telling, is testified by the several calls by Pakistan for ending the firing and beginning talks to stabilise the LoC. For the moment, it is quiet.
How seriously the new Nawaz Sharif Government in Pakistan took the firing and the loss of Pakistani lives is explained by two parliamentary resolutions and a meeting of the Defence Committee of the Cabinet condemning Indian aggression, centre-staging Kashmir and advocating a revisit of existing mechanisms for strengthening the ceasefire agreement. Mr Sharif has indicated that his election victory is a mandate for peace with India. Despite the tough talking, the civilian Government, it is clear, wishes to defuse tension and resume dialogue with India.
Pakistan media's reportage of the Poonch ambush and its aftermath is instructive. It contends that Indian Kashmiri militants carried out the ambush; Indian Defence Minister changed his statement on the incident; the Indian Director-General of Military Operations did not mention the ambush to his counterpart in their weekly conversation nine hours after the incident and the FIR attributed the ambush to terrorists; India does not want Pakistan to fight terrorism as by activating the LoC, it wants re-deployment of troops from the west to the east. In short, India is painted as the villain of the piece. Interestingly, the Hizb ul-Mujahideen was quick to take credit for the ambush but later the claim was retracted. Mr Sharif's Special Envoy to India Shahryar Khan told journalists in London that, "Our extremists have done it to derail the peace process".
The firefight on the LoC registered an escalation from small arms to the use of heavy artillery in the faraway Kargil sector which has been dormant since 2003. Why activate Kargil where Pakistan Army committed in 1999 the second blunder after 1971? So, why the sudden bursts of firing? For the Pakistani Army and the ISI, cross-LoC insurgency has slackened to unacceptable levels and requires a leg up. The terrorist population has dwindled to below 300 and fresh blood has to be injected before the passes close in the next two months.
This is a familiar story but attempts at infiltration are no longer succeeding as they did before the fencing was laid in 2003-2004. With 600 infiltration attempts in 2005, the record shows a declining trend from 277 tries in 2011 to nearly 270 in 2012. In 2013, infiltration attempts till August 31 were double that of the corresponding period last year. This is one of the factors for the focussed breach of the ceasefire agreement and the destabilisation of the LoC.
The Pakistani Army and the ISI, which are key opponents of normalisation of relations with India, are sending unsubtle messages across the LoC and from Lahore streets through their jihadi adjuncts that they will decide when to make peace overtures to New Delhi. Earlier this year, the Defence of Pakistan Council of Jihadis took to the streets objecting to India being granted Most Favoured Nation status, the breakthrough Confidence Building Measures for revival of dialogue. Taking the cue, Pakistan Finance Minister Ishaq Dar endorsed the sentiment saying there is no plan to give MFN status "because we need to normalise the situation on the ground", meaning the LoC. Poonch has derailed any chance of normalisation and business-as-usual between India and Pakistan. Scheduled Secretary-level talks are unlikely before a possible prime ministerial engagement in New York end-September on the sidelines of the United Nations General Assembly. Meanwhile, the Pakistan Foreign Office is seeking constructive engagement by reviving tired ideas like joint patrolling and the United Nations Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan. Difficult terrain, unrecorded mines and fencing rule out any joint patrolling which is normally against a common threat. Pakistani infiltrators pose a one-way threat and are aided by the Pakistan Army in their evil enterprise. UNMOGIP was derecognised by India after the surrender and defeat of the Pakistan Army in 1971.
Army chief General Bikram Singh has sent the correct message to the Pakistani military establishment, not to mess with his lads. Similarly he has asked soldiers on the LoC not to lower their guard and provide easy targets for Pakistani predators. But for sanity to return astride the LoC, the Pakistani Army must demonstrate in deeds, its much-touted change of heart in removing India from the Enemy No 1 slot. While General Ashfaq Parvez Kayani may have said that Pakistan's primary threat is internal, from terrorism, he has never said India is not a threat.
Still the 2003 ceasefire agreement should be revisited to prevent its breakdown. Is there a case for some political monitoring of the LoC akin to the Line of Actual Control or should the Army be allowed to retain the traditional free hand in LoC management? The transition in Afghanistan after US withdrawal will pose fresh challenges to the LoC. Already terrorist groups have warned of raising the ante by reviving fidayeen attacks, insurgency and sabotage. Both the fencing and counter-insurgency grid require a review.
The periodic admission by Pakistani scholars that militants were created for both flanks, to achieve strategic depth in the west and a strategic equaliser in the east, has not made the 'deep state' rethink its backlash. If Kashmir is the jugular vein, Afghanistan is the artificial valve keeping the heart ticking. Soon the heart will give in. Last month, while prime ministerial envoys Shahryar Khan and Satinder Lambah were back-channelling in Dubai to engineer the New York meeting, Indian intelligence agencies made big terrorist catches like Abdul Karim 'Tunda' and Yasin Bhatkal with strong terrorist ties to Pakistan. India's use of the phrase 'civilian Government in Pakistan' to delink it from the 'deep state' matches the futility of insulating talks from terror. For normalising the 'deep state', covert punitive reprisals have to replace the failed reactive strategy. |
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