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| Success has many fathers, failure is an orphan | | | Early Times Report
Jammu, Sept 28: Those who talk of security lapse while referring to the Thursday's twin attack on Hiranagar Police Station and the Army camp at Samba seem to have lost sight of the old adage "success has many fathers and failure is an orphan."
Again those who blame the forces, guarding the IB, for some lapse seem to be unaware of the difficult, rather tough, border terrain in Jammu and Kashmir. The entire Indo-Pak border in Jammu and Kashmir is dotted with rivers, ravines, gorges, mountain slopes, thick forest belts which allow militants to take the advantage while trying to sneak into the Indian State.
At times the success achieved by troops in foiling ingress bids does not receive as much appreciation as any failure on the part of security forces to check infiltration receives deep criticism bordering on condemnation. And those who held security forces responsible for some lapse which allowed a group of militants to sneak into Hiranagar failed to praise and appreciate troops who foiled a major infiltration bid in Kupwara sector in which nearly 12 militants were killed.
And those ignorant about the border terrain need to be reminded that a group of militants may have sneaked into Hiranagar segment from across the IB after a stretch of the border fence had been damaged because of rain caused floods in the area. Once the border fence was found to have been washed away by floods militants may have taken advantage of it.
But tongues were set on wagging over the possible lapse having been committed by the BSF whose jawans guard the IB. And the critics went on praising the Army for ensuring better border management against infiltration. And those who hold such a view need to be told that in various segments on this side of the IB, Army has set up camps which are called second line of defence.
One needs to realise that troops or men of the BSF cannot be faulted for security lapse when they have been able to maintain round the clock vigil on the LOC and the IB resulting in the marked decline in the level of ingress. Since 1992 the rate of infiltration has shown decline and during these last 19 years it has never been an open border for ingress and exfiltration as was the case between 1989-1993. It may sound least plausible when analysts and security experts try to find fault with the border management being carried out by the BSF or even by the Army.
And when groups of militants receive assistance and support from the Pakistan Army and other Pak border smugglers for sneaking into Jammu and Kashmir occasional success cannot be ruled out. And this is what might have taken place in Hiranagar sector where infiltrators took the advantage of the damaged fence and the Nallah. After all when several training camps for terrorists continue to exist across the border the Pak army authorities have to devise various ways and means for pushing some militants into Jammu and Kashmir.
According to inputs of intelligence agencies, training camp, located in the middle of a forest in Kacharban, had been declared out of bounds for PoK civilians, including shepherds who frequented the area for green pastures. Though opposite the Poonch sector, Pakistan conducts advanced training for militants at Bagh, Halanshumali, Padhar, Rawalakote, Kotli, Halan, Kaliar, Gulpur, Aliabad and Forwad Kahuta. The highly-fortified camp in Kacharban has become "very active" since August 18, as per these inputs.
The Thursday's incident should serve as a lesson for the Army authorities in Jammu and Kashmir. Instead of posting one security or a couple of security guards at the entrances and exits of the camps there is need for fortifying these entrances with deployment of more than half dozen guards. Infiltrators were able to sneak into the Army camp at Samba only after they eliminated the official guarding the entrance. Had there been more than five to six guards others could have retaliated and prevented the three militants from entering into the camp.
This standard needs to be followed by the police. Additional guards need to be posted at very entry point so that militants do not succeed in walking into the police station for slaughtering constables. Whatever may be the overall level of security threat the entire counter infiltration and anti-insurgency measures need to be reviewed and later strengthened. |
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